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Sing in me, O muse, and through me tell the myth, 
Of that man skilled in all the ways of contending; 
A wanderer, harried for years on end… 
 
You who seek a great fortune, 
You who are now in chains. 
You will find a fortune – 
Though it not be the fortune you seek! 
 
First you must travel, 
A long and difficult road… 
A road fraught with peril… 
You shall see things, 
Wonderful to tell. 
And O so many startlements… 
 
I cannot tell you how long this road shall be. 
But fear not the obstacles in your path, 
For fate has vouchsafed your reward. 
Though the road may wind, 
Yea, your hearts grow weary – 
Still shall ye follow the way! 
Even unto… your salvation? 
 
  O Brother, Where Art Thou? 
Coen brothers. 
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The future is prologue… 
 
 Prometheus v.2.0. 
 
Is there anybody, at the beginning of the 21st century, that remembers where man originally 
comes from? If not, let me spin you the tale where from, so you may envision where to…  
 
After the golden race, subjects of Cronos, who lived without cares, eating honey that dripped 
from trees, were lulled into sleep… came  the silver race, likewise divinely created. The silver 
race was ignorant, though they lived to be a hundred years. To revel in ignorance while blessed 
with longevity… Never! Zeus blasted them into oblivion on a whim. After infernal thunderbolts 
rained down unto the earth, setting ablaze the trees until they were nothing but ash… came the 
brazen race, who fell as fruits from ash-trees, born armed with weapons. They ate flesh; the 
cornucopia of plenty was depleted. With scarcity abound they made war, reveling in the rapture 
of combat, but apart from that were insolent men. Blackened by birth, Nyx seized them all. Next 
came the second brazen race, who were nobler, being begotten by Olympians on mortal 
mothers. They fought gloriously in the siege of Thebes, the expedition of the Argonauts and the 
Trojan War. These men, who are heroes of the iron race, now dwell in the Elysian Fields.   
 And so the iron race was begotten by men of the second brazen race on mortal mothers; 
unworthy descendants – to see one of these one need only look into the mirror. Why, if we be 
miscreants, are we still here today to spin the original tale? The reason we have not been 
extirpated by Zeus is Prometheus, that most cheeky mythological bugger… 
 
In the titanomachy between the titans and the Olympians, Prometheus, son of Ouranos and Gaia, 
sided with the Olympians and was made of their kind. Athene taught him architecture, 
mathematics, medicine and other arts. Prometheus passed these on to mankind, thereby giving 
us the essential equipment for the pursuit of knowledge through technology; giving us the Grand 
Style needed to treat knowledge through technology as a cultural endeavor.   
Zeus, foreseeing that man was ultimately destined to surpass the Olympians in power, 
grew angry… Jealous anger awakened because we are capable of growth, never subject to the 
eternal boredom of perfection that holds hostage the gods. To build towards and ultimately 
exceed Olympian ‘perfection’ and still be hungry for more, that is the fate Zeus allotted us – and 
he couldn’t stomach it.  
Dark clouds gathered…  
Just before apocalyptic thunder began to roll over heads-in-the-clouds-men, Prometheus 
intervened with Zeus to spare mankind. Zeus, remembering the services rendered by 
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Prometheus in the titanomachy, forgot the nature of Prometheus as a traitor to his kind and 
granted us mercy… but punished Prometheus by withholding fire to mankind. In doing so, the 
flame needed to kindle the passion of the Greeks’ Grand Style went out and mankind was 
plummeted into darkness. Zeus meanwhile, having nipped mankind in the bud, was pleased. To 
celebrate his victory he threw himself a bacchanal on mount Olympus, getting drunk and 
ravishing his women.  
But Prometheus’ hubris got the better of him. As Zeus lay, sunken deep in drunken 
dreams, Prometheus went to Athene to implore her to grant him backstairs admittance to 
Olympus, and this she did – eventually… Upon arrival at the summit, he lit a torch at the fiery 
chariot of the Sun and broke from it a fragment of glowing charcoal, which he thrust into the 
pithy hollow of a fennel-stalk. Then, extinguishing his torch, he snuck away to present fire to 
mankind. 
When Zeus awoke to find mankind busy bees again, he swore revenge. He ordered 
Hephaestus to make a clay woman; Pandora. Zeus sent her to Prometheus’ brother Epimetheus 
so they may be wed, but Prometheus had warned him never to accept a gift from Greeks, so 
Epimetheus respectfully excused himself. In turn Prometheus, getting the better of Zeus on three 
occasions, was chained to a pillar in the Caucasian mountains, where an eagle tore at his liver all 
day. Each night it grew back and at daybreak the eagle came circling down again  – and so on in 
perpetuity… 
Zeus excused his savagery by circulating what he believed a falsehood: Athene, he said, 
had invited Prometheus to Olympus for a secret love affair. She provided access to the summit, it 
made sense the other Olympians would believe it. Unbeknownst to him, he was in the right. The 
never before uncovered truth of the matter is, however, more opportunistic and prophetic for 
mankind. Prometheus came to Olympus for our sake, and imploring Athene to get in her good 
graces, he made love to her with a longing passion that far-exceeded Olympian ravishing. He 
made her feel the all too human potential of unfulfilled wanting with your whole being… and it 
rocked her perfect Olympian world by Zeus’ side. Athene, swept up in ecstatic rapture, having 
tasted what mankind will become, couldn’t withhold Prometheus anything… Not even truth 
herself could be withheld from him by Athene, for she gave birth to Aletheia; the daughter not of 
Zeus, but of Prometheus. Aletheia; goddess of childbirth.  
Truth, I always found, has a distinct human halo about her… And she is essentially our 
half-sister by progeny; our relationship to her has always been semi-incestuous. 
Epimetheus meanwhile, having heard what fate had befallen his brother, hastened to 
marry Pandora and undo the torture of his brother at the hands of Zeus. But Pandora was the 
original revenge Zeus had sworn. In marrying her off to Epimetheus vengeance with a vengeance 
was seemingly exacted – for Pandora was as mischievous as she was beautiful. The night of their 
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wedding Pandora opened a jar, which Prometheus had told Epimetheus never to open, in which 
he had imprisoned the Spites that might plague mankind: Old Age, Labor, Vice and Discord. Out 
these flew to attack mankind. Yet we did not succumb to them, because Delusive Hope, whom 
Prometheus had also shut in the jar, discourages us from a general suicide by whispering lies… 
Lies? Lies to refrain from suicide are truths to keep striving. Hope lives – even delusive hope that 
‘lies’. Her original falsity is the savior of mankind. She is our ontological fallacy; the genie in 
Pandora’s jar. Delusive Hope’s whispers kept us going, building, discovering, applying ourselves 
to existence – and so we strived. Because all we need when something ostensibly cannot be done 
is the faintest whisper carried on the winds of change…   
 
So what of truth? What of Aletheia?  Who is she? This goddess of childbirth cares for the fate of 
mankind and the children of men in particular. Since our recent reconciliation, our relation has 
become intensely private after 2.5 millennia of separation at the hands of the polarizing god of 
metaphysics; the deified Socrates, we have almost become seamlessly atoned today, like four 
hands on a pregnant belly… Now that we approach the level of power over nature and perfection 
of the body wherein the Olympians exalted, we’ve become worthy bed-partners. Whoever 
considers this hubris need only remember: when in doubt – act… If there’s anything Prometheus 
as a father taught us it’s that hubris gets you ahead, though the consequences be dire. We cannot 
help ourselves – we’re a chip off the old block!  
In her belly grows a new Prometheus, made to our likening and liking. This Prometheus 
will be created in our spotless image of him, which is to say: image of us. By us, for us, from us… 
Provided we are willing to stand by her side, surrender to the as of yet concealed future and not 
resist the onslaught of man that lies in her loins. Ever since we were essentially awakened by 
Prometheus, who kindled in us the pursuit of excellence by knowledge through technology, we were 
destined to do this by way of Aletheia…  What? –To skillfully remake man to our imagination and 
crown him truth. And Mother Truth is – and always has been – the caring vessel for our re-
creation as man. She cannot Be separate from man, nor can man exist without her. She carries 
our child in her womb, where man and truth will converge into art. She will die in childbirth… 
and the original flame that kindled man’s striving for knowledge through technology will 
extinguish, only to be relit as the Who she will bring forth.  
 
I herald this futuristic apotheosis of superficiality, for we will become superficial out of depth, 
like the Greeks, but different: for the Greeks’ pursuit of knowledge through technology will be 
the original depth our new-found superficiality will cover up. Though we too, like the Greeks, 
still worship the human form as the most perfect, we take that form as our private identity, not 
our outward appearance. The unconditional beauty of ourselves, the way we live our lives as 
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projects aimed at outshining other projects one encounters along the virtual way, are what we 
worship again today through the square-form whose matter shines tantalizingly upon our faces. 
We live in an age of virtual heroes; YouTubers, Insta-celebs and what not… A mythological age 
aimed at ordering up and accumulating as much of life’s experiences as possible, a process that 
comes-to-pass by enshrining your life on a pedestal build of likes and shares in the virtual world. 
Superficial indeed… Our superficiality is the writing on the screen of the apotheosis dawning on 
us, which starts with the virtual age, whose origin is the Internet. Via aesthetic rapture, truth and 
art start to merge into one another again after 2500 years of separation, as they were once 
merged in the original clearing that arose out of oblivion, when wonderment dawned on men as 
men dawned, which started us on our way with question: what is being qua being? What is, for 
short, The Thing? And all it took after the dichotomy of two worlds was overcome was to make a 
real-time mirror that reflects and feed backs world privately to you, me, everybody, right here, 
right now; a mirror challenged forth through the hands and minds of men riding the current of 
modern technology. Deep-mirror, mirror-image in the screen, show me the preflection of an origin 
unforeseen… 
 
That is my impression wherefrom we hail and where to we are beckoned. –And I don’t doubt 
you will have to travel 250 years forward to find someone who can say: it is mine, too…  
You think I’m peddling BS? I hear your doubtful silence, I see disbelief in your eyes. But 
think back, listing closely and look ahead… We can see this futuristic apotheosis starting to 
happen already, right here and now, as what I will explain as the privatization of truth.  
Is it not Heidegger that says art is the realm that holds the key to the rethinking of 
technology?1 But this rethinking asks after a constellation, for which Heidegger provides a 
method; that of Gelassenheit. If this method is not practiced, modern technology will make us 
“lose access to the primal truth.”2 Look around – you see Gelassenheit prevailing anywhere? Is the 
Western world growing-on-its-own or resting-in-itself? It’s adrift… its destining lacks conviction; 
its Grand Style is self-destructing… Do not fret, dearest reader! All creation requires destruction. 
In what follows I will swing the hammer against ‘the houses of the holy’ – the sovereign Self and 
its Truth – so you might envision what I envision, once enough walls have been knocked down 
for you to see.  
  
                                                          
1 Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, translated by William Lovitt, 
Harper and Row 1977, p. 35 
2 Ibid. p. 28 
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 Introduction 
 
Only astonishment, boredom, angst and oblivion about the world are pretexts to be overcome by 
philosophical questions. You don’t feel at home in- or at one with the world. The familiarity is 
gone and the questions this unfamiliarity brings to bear is what sets you out on the road to 
harmony.  
 
One night I was at home reading Heidegger’s Question concerning Technology. The light failed; 
darkness enveloped me. I took my phone and used its flashlight to orient myself. While was 
browsing my drawers for candles, the light flipped on again as though nothing had happened. As 
I was checking WhatsApp while I had my phone in hand anyway, I noticed I had no access to the 
Internet. Electricity in all its essential facets still eluded me. I was in the dark, unable to orient 
myself, as no digital information was accessible to me… Being cut off from the Internet means 
being cut off from my day to day access to the world’s memory; its present happenings, as well 
as cut off from my practical, everyday future. I couldn’t put any query to the Internet to orient 
myself regarding my concerns.  
Being offline came as a shock. All of a sudden the world felt like a small, unheimisch cage; 
like I didn’t belong – offline, with only my senses that extend naturally through time and space to 
experience my immediate surroundings, cut off from what is happening out there: the internet 
that is always within arm’s length on my phone. Even in my own home, I couldn’t shake the 
feeling I first and foremost belonged out there, because in our day and age, especially in the 
West, it is the way to be – and I was missing out, oblivious as to what was happening in the 
world for me. FOMO brought to bear the angst of not-belonging, which in turn broached 
questions:  
What is the Internet? What do we do with it? How does it affect our lives? How is our 
perception of the world changed because of it? And is there such a ‘thing’ as the virtual world? 
This all led me to formulate the following thesis-question and claim: 
 
Question: How is the virtual world disclosed to us through the Internet and how does this 
disclosing in turn change our understanding of- and behavior (Being) in the real world?  
 
Claim: Because disclosing and disclosedness relate in a primordial way to the phenomenon of 
truth, the radical difference in the way the virtual world is disclosed to us in turn transforms the 
way truth is found by us and what truth is for us. Truth has become privatized. Therefore, the 
Internet is an origin. Every origin comes at a loss. In our case access to primal truth, as 
envisioned by Heidegger in The Question Concerning Technology. This inaccessibility means that 
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the previous disclosedness of world will be closed off and sink into oblivion, a fate hidden in 
coining our day and age the post-truth era.  
 
- In Division I I will set the stage by framing Heidegger’s thought as the transformative 
rethinking of Aristotle and contrasting it to Descartes.  
- In Division II I will think the Internet as a one-of-a-kind-thing akin an artwork by 
explaining The Origin of the Work of Art. 
- In Division III I will think the virtual world engendered by the Internet as a structure of 
relational significance and involvement akin Heidegger’s reading of world in Being & 
Time. 
- In Division IV I will think the way the virtual world is disclosed to us by alluding to mood 
and state-of-mind as Being-there in Being & Time. 
- In Division V I will explain the privatization of truth by elucidating Heidegger’s reading 
of truth as aletheia in Being & Time. 
Let’s get to it! 
  
9 
 
I 
Setting the stage 
 Heidegger as Aristotle’s ventriloquist. 
 
There is a question3 and a definition4 provided by Aristotle in Metaphysics that guide my thesis. 
The question concerns the essence of being; ti to on tis he ousia and the definition concerns man: 
the being that exists aided by technology and consideration; kai technei kai logismois. 
Throughout my thesis, I will come back to this question and this definition. 
 
Heidegger’s thinking  is a rethinking of Aristotle. On Heidegger’s interpretation, Aristotle argues 
that meaningful appearances of beings require a way in which we take what is made present as. 
This capacity for taking-as and making-present-to is the essence of human existence. The taking-
as unifies the different modes of Being, with the taking meaning understandable and as meaning 
made present. For Heidegger, taking-as is rooted not just in the present – as it has been taken 
throughout the tradition of metaphysics –, but in a deeper temporal unity of past meanings and 
future possibilities.  
 Heidegger’s Ontological Difference articulated in the Guiding and the Grounding 
Question clarifies what this means. 
 
I move in a world where people tend to think of philosophers as tree-hugging hippies. This 
valuation isn’t unjustified. Even those who do not seek the fruits of wisdom that philosophy 
bears, are familiar with Descartes’ likening of philosophy to a tree:  
 
“The whole of philosophy is like a tree. The roots are metaphysics, the trunk is physics, and 
the branches emerging from the trunk are all the other sciences..” 
 –René Descartes, The Principles of Philosophy, preface, p. 6. 
 
To exacerbate matters, Heidegger improves upon Descartes’ metaphor in Was ist Metaphysik by 
asking what remains unsaid in Descartes, namely the ground wherefrom the tree draws its 
sustenance and wherein it finds stability.5 This rooting of Descartes’ metaphor is also articulated 
between what Heidegger calls the Guiding Question of philosophy: what is the essence of being 
and the Grounding Question of philosophy: what is Being.6 A tree is a being; it is. But what 
provides the ground and clearing for the tree to come up as tree; wherein does the tree root as 
tree? –That would be Being.  
                                                          
3 Aristotle, Metaphysica VII, 1028b 2 
4 Ibid. I, 980b 28 
5 Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken, Frankfurt a. M. 1978, p. 361 
6 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche I, Pfullingen 1961, §11 
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According to Heidegger, Aristotle’s first question actually contains two questions:  
- It asks after being qua being.  
- It seeks to answer being as a whole by asking for a prima causa or supreme being; 
theion. 7 
Philosophy has never inquired after what Being itself is. It has kept a fixed gaze on being, 
never moving past by conjuring up a supreme being to explain the whole of being. Heidegger 
coins the term onto-theo-logy to signify the dereliction of philosophy to seek and understand 
that what makes a being be, is never another being that is magically endowed with the capacity 
for creation, but something else entirely, provided we do not take some-thing literally, for, as 
Heidegger points out, “the Being of being ‘is’ not itself a being.”8  
Heidegger formulates the Grounding Question: what is Being itself. If we were to only ask 
the Guiding Question we cannot reach the center of philosophy, but will remain stuck in the 
anteroom of philosophy juggling about the absolute values of truth, good and beauty, which 
presuppose the dichotomy of two worlds; one of appearance and one of truth, and all the 
classical oppositions that come with this metaphysical territory.9 This anteroom shows beings to 
us in light of the metaphysical trinity of absolute values, which preconditions the way beings 
appear to us, seen from us and by us. This light is misguiding, yet shines with a private intensity 
as never before. These values have been reduced to human, all too human projections we have 
mistakenly taken to be at the center of  things because we took being as a whole to be created 
intentionally by a supreme being. But God is dead and with His demise the answers to the 
Guiding Question seemingly depleted…  
 
With the death of God made explicit by Nietzsche no prima causa can be unveiled by the Guiding 
Question to explain the essence being needs in order to be as is. Heidegger attempts with the 
Grounding Question to provide the framework to articulate Being in its relation to beings, in its 
relation to man – and finally, Being in itself. He takes Being as that which shows itself in our 
activities; both of mankind (Dasein as a communal way of life) and individual Dasein that moves 
and orients itself within the scope of the communal way of life. Whether it be as a way of life or 
an individual, we have a natural understanding of Being. It is what silently guides us in our 
interaction with things and other Dasein.10   
To think Being means to think the way our understanding is guided and wherein this 
understanding is grounded; the how and the where. This guidance of how to where is not a 
matter of man’s volition, because man partakes in Being. However, there is no Being without 
                                                          
7 Gerard Visser, Nietzsche & Heidegger, SUN Nijmegen 1989, p. 31 
8 Martin Heidegger, Being & Time, translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, Blackwell 1985, § 2 
9 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche I, Pfullingen 1961, §11 
10 Martin Heidegger, Being & Time, translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, Blackwell 1985, § 2 
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man, nor man without Being. Man has a unique relation to Being, since he is capable of asking 
questions and seeking answers about what it means to be.  
But how do people nowadays sense meaning? Sensing structures the way we ask 
questions and seek possible answers. And it goes via your smartphone or personal computer, 
hooked up to the Internet, disclosing the virtual world to you. The medium is an integral part of 
any message… So what is this thing called the Internet? 
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II 
The Internet 
 
 What is the Internet?  
 
What is the Internet? The Internet is a thing; a web of optic-fiber woven many a-times around 
the Earth that enables information-exchange with the speed of light. A thing gathers what 
belongs to it under its heading. To establish such a heading you need a sign that refers to the 
thing, and so naming invest the thing with the power to gather, indicate and refer.  
For instance: If we think of ‘chair’ this sign gathers, reveals and circumspectively 
discloses what belongs under its heading as its possible forms and matter, and what ‘chair’ as an 
item of living-equipment refers to with-in a greater referential whole of possible involvements. 
We use chairs, but does anyone nowadays question ‘chair’ or whatever is in question – in any 
thoughtful sense? Or do we, when a question occurs “just google it”, thereby outsourcing the 
thinking-process of revealing to that way of revealing distinct to the Internet’s virtual world? 
Just google “Internet” if you want to know its definitions.  
Definitions of what the internet’s function is for us aside,  how do we encounter it as a 
thing? What kind of thing is the Internet? As I’ll attempt to show, the Internet is equipment on 
the one hand, but as equipment it is invested with the world-disclosing-power of the artwork on 
the other. 
 
The Internet is a thing we interact with on a daily basis. It is often the first thing encountered 
when we wake up and the last thing we handle before going to sleep. When you look at your 
phone for the time, it is synched with the Internet and your location. The Internet is valuable 
because of the amount of time we spent interacting with it, and as such it is a special kind of 
thing ‘invested with a special kind of value’, namely: ontological value. The virtual world’s Being 
is constituted by ontological power, defined as time spent and attention given. However, it 
belongs to things ‘invested with value’ that they can be handled as equipment possessing the 
Being of Readiness-to-hand.11 The Internet, too, is equipment with the Being of the Readiness-to-
hand; but of what kind? –It is world-disclosing-equipment.  
The Internet’s possibility for disclosure, the queries and clicks taken as signs and 
references, are in turn mediated through operating the smartphone or computer. But note: every 
user is involved with-in the virtual world’s referential structure and is the constitutive sign for 
this entire global network of significance. 
                                                          
11 The ready-to-hand is the primary mode in which we encounter entities as things  "in order to" do 
something. (source: Wikipedia’s Glossary of Terms concerning Heidegger) 
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Smartphones and computers, too, are properly thought of as equipment. But of what kind? One 
need only to think of being deprived of your smartphone or having your personal computer 
crash – and the accompanying dread where you feel as though you lost part of yourself – to see 
how important their functioning as equipment is. These items of equipment feel as though they 
belong to our person; we are attuned to them as though they were part of our embodiment. 
These items of equipment are private – they are private equipment.12 Nobody else can access my 
phone without password or fingerprint. It does not get more private than that. When my 
smartphone, computer or access to the Internet fails me, I cannot wholly be myself without them, 
because I cannot go about my business; its loss in whatever way affects my behavior directly.  
Reverse engineer this reasoning and it becomes clear that our usual dealings with things and 
people, our work and social-life, our presence in the world; our Being itself is affected by the 
Internet. These items of equipment, namely your smartphone and  computer are intensely private 
and hence the Internet is encountered in a private sense. Why? –Because the Internet is open for 
interaction through your particular smartphone or personal computer. In turn, this private sense 
extends over the Internet and discloses to us the virtual world in a privatized clearing. 
 
There is one thing called Internet and correspondingly a proper noun to signify it as a one-of-a-
kind thing. It is a thing in the sense planet Earth is a one-of-a-kind thing, or the Mona Lisa. So, 
what does it gather, what belongs under its heading, given the fact there is but one-of-its-kind? –
It gathers us; its users all over the world hooked up to it via smartphone or computer, into a 
singularity: right here, right now. This singularity has two sides: the one side is that the Internet 
itself is a singularity: there is but one of its kind. The other side is that each person hooked up to 
it experiences the virtual world that matters to him as this singularity of right here, right  now. 
How? Because the Internet brings its users together with the speed of light, reducing our sense 
of time and space into a rectangular screen that incessantly shines in front of your nose, within 
arm’s length, under your thumb. It gathers us into right here, right now.  
The information exchange with the speed of light is how this Internet-gathering is 
achieved. But what does this gathering into right here, right now constitute? Involvement and 
relational significance: the constituents of world. Why? –For each person hooked up to the 
Internet is involved with it and has a stake in its significance. This participating in turn gives rise 
to phenomenon of the virtual world, for wherever men are brought together by a thing through 
which they orient themselves and therefore sense meaning in their involvement with it, that 
thing has disclosing power. What does the Internet disclose? –The virtual world. 
                                                          
12 For more on Equipment, the modes of Readiness-to-hand and Presence-at-hand, see: Being & Time, §§ 
14/15/16 
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Other one-of-a-kind-things that have world-disclosing-power Heidegger calls artworks. Let’s see 
if The Origin of the Work of Art offers perspectives to the question I seek to answer: What is the 
Internet? 
 
 Plato’s devaluation of art as impetus of technological subjectivism 
 
The distinction this text hinges on is that of Kunst als Bild and Kunst als Bau – coined by Dieter 
Jähnig in Weltgeschichte: Kunstgeschichte. This distinction goes back to Plato’s devaluation of art 
in Politeia13 wherein he argues for serviceability over passionate sensibility on logical and moral 
grounds.14  
The method to ascertain truth becomes a logical one of eidos corresponding to idea. The 
subject-object/S=P-relation is born by articulating the thing represented (eidos) through this 
grammatical construction. Truth becomes orthotes, a method of directed perceiving and 
articulating; uttering (verba dicendi).15  
Since passions bar men from reaching the eternal truth of the ideas, they are condemned 
as not belonging to the best possible life – which is the central question of Politeia. That is the 
moral ground for the devaluation. 
The artwork is reduced to mimesis and the thing made to function elevated to a higher 
degree – of conformity to its idea. Accordingly, the enjoyment of the thing depicted in the work 
brought forth is of lower value than the serviceability of the thing made. Plato uses five 
examples, three of which are about the manufacturing of equipment. The eidos of the bed (kline) 
corresponds to its idea; the bed produced with a view to sleeping is the eidolon of its idea 
brought forth as its materialized form. But the bed depicted with a view to beautiful semblance 
stands farthest from the truth of the idea; it is the ‘non-functional’ eidolon of the bed made for 
sleeping, which is itself already the shadow of the idea. Likewise, passionate sensibility evoked 
through beautiful semblance is severed from exhibiting – corresponding to – the eternal truth of 
the idea it supposes to resemble.  
With that affectivity, the relation of sensibility to world as a way of perceiving, is declared 
devoid of truth and in its stead comes the abstract, logical subject-object-relation, which 
pervades our language and thought to this day. Truth came to pass  in Plato’s Politeia  only to 
stagnate into an operation of a subject representing the object through eidos in correspondence 
with the eternal idea of the object represented.  
                                                          
13 Plato, Politeia, X 597e 
14 Ibid. X 606d 
15 Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken, Frankfurt. a. M. 1978, p. 228. 
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I claim, as does Heidegger: Plato’s Politeia is where technological subjectivism taken as the drive 
to objective truth regarding the thing received its impetus. This impetus drives the destining of 
Western culture. The entire tradition of metaphysics is an ever-widening orbit of subjectivism, 
placing man more and more at the centre of things. This movement originated with the change 
of truth in Plato, birthing the subject-object-dichotomy and its two worlds: the shadowy, 
sensible world of becoming, and the clairvoyant, ideal world of eternal truth. As a result art 
becomes worldly as semblance and truth remains other-worldly. The centre between man and 
world – affectivity – cannot hold and the original self-gathering of things is swallowed up by the 
gaping void of sensibility exhibited in this dichotomy. Nietzsche’s entire philosophical 
development can be read as the attempt to fill this void, when we writes in a late-period 
notation:  
 
"Very early in my life I took the question of the relation of art to truth seriously: and even 
now I stand in holy dread in the face of this discordance" 
-Friedrich Nietzsche, Kritische Gesamtausgabe (KGW) VIII.3: 296 
 
It’s a consequential happening – Plato’s devaluation entails a transformation of the essence of 
truth, i.e. the way truth is found, but we need to leave this past transformation be in order to 
focus on the privatization of truth as the one happening right here and now.   
 
Plato’s taking functionality as identity cleared the way for Descartes cogito ergo sum, in which 
technological subjectivism came to form as the modern sciences we know today. For Descartes 
takes the subject as the only thing one can truly be certain of. The idea of identity constituted by 
the function a thing has for us (as an object), means of course its identity is constituted by us (as 
a subject). Truth becomes  grounded in the self-consciousness of the individual ego. 
But Descartes’ subject isn’t all thought. The thinking subject as fundamentum 
inconcussum also cleared the way for the rise of aesthetics as a realm for philosophical inquiry.16 
Descartes’ doubt concerning the existence of the outside world likewise assured the feeling 
subject’s lived-experience – which takes place inside the private theatre of the soul – as being 
real, although unmeasurable and therefore irrational. That sphere of the subject still lay pro-
fundamentum inconcussum. It has been unearthed by Nietzsche’s turn to the body.  
Nowadays, this feeling subject has itself become the measure of things, with everything 
shown to it tripping the light fantastic of the virtual world – the private theatre for every 
embodied soul. Who needs congruent scientific truth on the basis of what can be objectively 
                                                          
16 Martin Heidegger, The Will to Power as Art, translated by David Ferrell Krell 1991, p. 83 
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measured in whatever way, shape or form, when you have private truth on the basis of you 
identifying yourself with it subjectively? The subject is constitutive for what counts as an object 
anyhow, so “I’ll be the judge as to what is objective and in what sense, thank you very much(!)” –
When something shown in your private theatre jives with your ‘soul’, that’s all the congruence 
needed. However, this analogy of us as subjects to the Internet as Object does not hit the 
Internet’s essence, which is akin the artwork’s: it has world-disclosing-power. 
 
 Thing-concepts.  
 
Heidegger’s stake in the text is to explicate what the artwork is. Heidegger asks what is thingly 
about the work – for it is obviously a thing. He gives examples of the thingness of the thing that 
have dominated Western thought and have since long becomes self-evident.17 
These concepts do not meet the thingly aspect the thing, its growing-on-its-own  and 
resting-within-itself. Heidegger states that “we have the feeling that violence is done to the thingly 
in the thing”18, which bars us from becoming thoughtful. What weight do we give this feeling? –
The mood is centre-weight that brings us to middle-ground:  
 
“What we name ‘feeling’ or ‘mood’ is more perceptive, because it is more open to Being than 
all reason. Of course the familiar concept of the thing fits everything every time. Nevertheless, it 
overtakes the thing.”19 
 
This overtaking can perhaps be avoided by the way the thing shows itself as formed stuff.  
 
The thing as formed stuff. What gives the thing constancy in its presence is stuff – and with it the 
form is co-posited. However, Heidegger mistrusts this explication as well. Why? –On the grounds 
that “if indeed form is ordained to the rational and stuff to the irrational, and if the rational is 
taken to be the logical, while the irrational is the illogical (i.e. sensible –RB), and if with this 
conceptual pair, form/stuff, is coupled also the subject-object-relation, then the power of 
representation has availed itself of a conceptual mechanism to which nothing can resist.”20 
 This concept still holds two worlds apart categorically, but this explication does prepare 
us to enter the middle ground and enables us to answer the question of the thingly aspect about 
the artwork.21 
                                                          
17 Martin Heidegger, Holzwege, Frankfurt a. M. 1977, p. 7.  
18 Ibid. p. 9  
19 Ibid. p. 9/10 
20 Ibid. p. 12  
21 Ibid. p. 11  
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This distinction of stuff and form, although it is the conceptual scheme for art-theory and 
aesthetics, does not originally belong to the domain of art. So the question becomes: “Where does 
the stuff-form jointure have its origin, in the thingly of the thing or the workly of the artwork?”22 –
Equipment is stuff standing in a particular form, but with equipment it is not the form that is the 
consequence of the stuffs organization, but the form determines the ordering of the stuff. The 
form is imposed upon the stuff with a view to serviceability – beforehand, meaning: its being 
brought forth has serviceability as a ground characteristic. Equipment is man-made intentionally 
with a view to function, i.e. what service it can provide to us. Hence, serviceability is the ground 
out of which the form-giving and choice of stuff are determined and vice versa wherein form and 
stuff are rooted.  
To recap; with stuff-form we hit the origin of the subject-object-relation birthed by Plato 
in Politeia. 
Stuff and form have their home, therefore, in equipment, characterized by functionality, 
i.e. serviceability.23 But what is serviceable about an artwork? You cannot produce a painting 
with a view to serviceability, the same way you produce a hammer.  Still, common sense dictates 
the work is produced. Heidegger hints the artwork hinges on this ambivalence – the work is a 
being brought forth by man, and yet, once brought forth, it rests in itself and grows on its own 
like a thing, because it isn’t produced with a view to utility:  
 
“The name equipment names what is produced on for its use and utility.  The equipment 
rests within itself as finished like a mere thing, but it does not have the growing-of-its-own (physis. 
–RB). On the other hand, the equipment shows kinship to the artwork, in so far as it is something 
brought-forth by a human hand (poiesis. –RB). However, the artwork, through its self-sufficient 
presence, rather resembles the mere thing growing-on-its-own and forced-to-nothing.”24  
 
Traditionally – Heidegger understands the dominance of thinking in terms of serviceability by 
grounding it in the Mosaic creation of the Biblical faith –  man is taken as a builder with the 
entirety of creation as stuff to impose form on. The stuff-form jointure, which determines the 
Being of  equipment as serviceability, easily lends itself as the “immediately intelligible 
constitution of every being, because man the maker has a share in the way equipment comes into 
Being.”25 Since equipment occupies this middle ground between mere thing and work – it is not a 
stretch for this thing-concept to encompass the both ends of that spectrum.  Because the 
Christian faith represents the whole of being as created intentionally by God, the mere thing too, 
                                                          
22 Ibid. p. 12/13  
23 Ibid. p. 13  
24 Ibid. p. 13/14 
25 Ibid. p. 14  
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as ens creatum, is thought out of the unity of materia and forma.26 Even with God dead we cannot 
get away from seeing the whole of being as being there – for us to use and utilize for ends we set, 
with stuff procured by us and forms we impose.  
 
Heidegger concludes we have long since lost the original speaking-power of thing-concepts like 
eidos and hule. But they are powerful. “In the course of the history of truth about the being 
(spurred on by Aristotle’s question –RB.), these explications have coupled themselves to one 
another so that they hold for thing, for equipment, and for work. This way preconceives all 
immediate experience of Being and ties down beforehand any effort to think the Being of whatever 
is.”27  
We need to be made aware of how we are tied down by these thing-concepts, in order to 
be able to become truly thoughtful. Only then can we think the thingness of the thing with 
respect to its Being and so thinking letting it rest upon itself.28  
The thingness of the thing… Heidegger’s asking the same question Aristotle’s asks. Indeed; 
“that the thingness of the thing lets itself be said with particular difficulty and only seldom, is 
unmistakably documented by the history of its explication. This history coincides with the destiny, 
in accordance with which Western thinking to this day has thought the being of beings. But is it an 
accident, that the thing as stuff and form attains a particular dominance? This determination of the 
thing stemmed from the explication of the Being-equipment of the equipment. This being, the 
equipment, is close to man’s representing, because it reaches into Being through our own 
producing.”29 
 
 From Kunst als Bild to Kunst als Bau. 
 
With the destruction of the thing-concepts complete, Heidegger embarks on the quest to 
experience “the Being-equipment of the equipment”.30 This question can only be answered if we 
stave off the overreaching of the habitual explications. To avoid letting ourselves be shackled, 
Heidegger alludes to a pictorial representation by Van Gogh portraying a pair of peasant shoes, 
instead of actual or represented shoes, to show how through this image (Bild) of the shoe-
equipment, the world (Bau) of the peasant (Bauer) who wears them is disclosed – and in so 
doing, understanding the serviceability of the shoes as reliability.31 
                                                          
26 Ibid. p. 14  
27 Ibid. p. 15/16  
28 Ibid. p. 16  
29 Ibid. p. 17  
30 Ibid. p. 19  
31 Ibid. p. 19  
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What is essential about Heidegger’s example, is that it is neither the shoes made with a 
view to serviceability nor a report about the process of making shoes through which the Being-
equipment of the equipment has been unearthed. It has been unearthed by the image in the 
artwork, through which “the Being-equipment of the equipment comes properly to its 
appearance.”32 This entails a reversal of the primacy given by Plato to the serviceability of the 
being over and above its beautiful semblance as being more truthful. It is the other way around, 
but not as mere semblance. Even though the painting cannot be utilized and is not subject to 
reliability, it has unveiled to us wherein the Being-equipment of the equipment in truth consists 
and rests-within-itself – as reliability. What is reliable, is that which can be built upon…  
Now we can ask the question concerning truth in relation to art. Heidegger:  
  
“What is happening here? Van Gogh’s painting is the opening up of what the equipment, the 
pair of peasant shoes, in truth is. This being stepped forth out into the uncoveredness of its Being. 
The uncoveredness of beings is called by the Greeks aletheia. In the work, if there happens an 
opening up of beings into what and how they are, a happening of truth is at work. In the work of 
art, the truth of beings has set itself to work.”33  
  
And he continues with a question to move from Kunst als Bild into the dimension of Kunst als 
Bau:  
 
“Is it our opinion that painting would take a copy of the actual and transpose this copy into 
a product of artistic production? –In no way! 
Thus the work of art is to render the universal Being of things. But where and how then is 
this universal Being, so that the artwork can agree with it? With what essence of what thing should 
then a Greek temple agree?”34 
 
With the Being of the artwork as constituting and disclosing world –with Kunst als Bau. How 
come a thing can set-itself-to-work – and so working disclose world and what it means to be 
human? What is this relation between work and truth?  
 
  “A Greek temple portrays nothing. The temple-work first joins and at once gathers around 
itself the unity of paths and relations in which birth and death, endurance and decay win for 
mankind the gestalt of its destiny. The swaying expanse of these open relations is the world of this 
                                                          
32 Ibid. p. 21 
33 Ibid. p. 21/22 
34 Ibid. p. 22 
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historical people. Only out of this world and in it does a people come back to itself for the fulfilment 
of its vocation.”35 
 
 Conclusion: what is the Internet and how does it disclose the virtual world?  
 
The artwork is Kunst als Bau; as a thing it opens world as a realm of historical meaning  and 
future possibilities. The work is a beacon for a people to orient itself.  
What thing nowadays renders what the Greek temple once did? –The Internet. It is the 
Internet that stands in the centre of the clearing as the being around which we congregate to 
coordinate our lives. It does so by gathering us with-in-virtual-world right here and now; the 
private realm of meaning and possibility that shines in front of your nose, within arm’s length 
under your thumb.  
The Internet has the same disclosing power exhibited in great works of art taken as one-
of-a-kind-things capable of rendering the universal Being of things. Likewise, there is but one 
Internet, yet contrary the artwork it renders our universal Being by gathering us with-in the 
right here, right now of the virtual world. Paradoxically, the virtual world in turn is disclosed to 
you and me in a private sense – updating you and me privately on whatever question or 
happening we’re involved with.  How? –This dimension of right here, right now is opened up by 
fixing our senses on the screen, by being bodily attuned to the private-equipment to the point of 
taking your smartphone as a technological extension of the self. Through this dimension we find 
ourselves to be somewhere else. We are raptured; aesthetically raptured. Aesthetic rapture is 
the mood distinct to the virtual world. 
With respect to this I claim: The Internet originally and the virtual world engendered by 
it constitute our future and present understanding of Being. A hint could be looking at how 
Heidegger’s saying “only out of this world and in it does a people come back to itself for the 
fulfilment of its vocation” fares against the Internet. Something happens. We exist in a world. In 
world stands the Internet as our beacon to orient ourselves within-the-world and our Being in it. 
The Internet achieves this orientation within-the-world by disclosing the virtual world. There 
are two worlds intermediated by the Internet. However, to move between two worlds there has 
to be a gateway. Our being turned away from one world and being drawn with-in another, 
transforms Heidegger’s ‘out-of’-‘in-it’-‘come-back’-structure from a circular motion into a back 
and forth. How we cross to and fro is via aesthetic rapture. But what of the fulfilment of our 
vocation? What is the future gestalt of our destiny? –If aesthetic rapture goes all the way, there 
will be no coming back to ourselves.  
                                                          
35 Ibid. p 31/32  
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What is this world that raptures us aesthetically and how do we relate to it? What is the 
virtual world and my grounds for claiming its Being as Being-with-in-the-virtual-world? 
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III 
The virtual world 
 
“In a world of illusion, 
you only see what you feel.” 
-Mysterious Times by Sash! featuring Tina Cousins 
 
 
 What is the virtual world? 
 
What is world? –World is a realm of historical meaning and future possibilities that provides us 
orientation to act in the present. Only in a world, taken as a gathered and structured whole of 
meaning and possibility, can our behavior be sensible and meaningful.  
 
What makes the virtual world virtual? –Contrary the ‘real’ world, its constituents of involvement 
and relational significance are visible and tangible on screen. The ontological constituents 
themselves have become ready-to-hand as equipment. How? Because the virtual world is only a 
global network of relational significance for all participants hooked up to the Internet, who, as 
participants,  are involved with-in its referential structure and constitute, via time and attention 
given, the ever-changing relational significance of the virtual world; its becoming as world. In 
turn, the world, too, has essentially become ready-to-hand as equipment through the visibility 
and manipulability of its constituents. But only virtually, right? –Yes, but this virtual character of 
the constituents of world becoming visible and manipulable has its blowback on the way we 
perceive the world and truth. Our perception of  world has become virtual due to its actual 
appearing to us as world. By contrast: you cannot see the world nor can you understand its 
relational character by manipulating the references.  
 
The term ‘virtual’ stems from Medieval Latin’s virtualis; meaning: being something in essence or 
effect, though not actually or in fact. The term has been used in the sense of not physically 
existing but made to appear by software since 1959. Paradoxically, the phenomenon of world is 
made to appear in the screen by sight and manipulable by touch as virtual world. But because 
the possibility of Being-with-in-the-virtual-world is beholden to our engagement with private-
equipment, this means in turn that the world in the phenomenological sense, as structural 
complexity of involvement and relational significance, has become privatized because it is 
disclosed in a private sense. Just imagine what concerns you take care of via this private sense: 
all shopping done with the touch of your thumb, brought to you on a time of your convenience. A 
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structure of involvement and relational significance tailored exactly to your identity; your 
private sign as the constitutive sign for your virtual disclosedness – that is how the virtual world 
is made to appear through your private equipment. 
 
Deeper still, ‘virtual’ derives from virtue (Latin: virtus); behavioral guidelines that stem from the 
trinity of values. In the virtual world, this trinity of values is brought into play, but in a reversed 
hierarchy and transformed structure of evaluation: the primary value is the aesthetic (for via the 
aesthetic the virtual world is disclosed and disclosable as world in the first place) and the 
evaluating is subject to statistical interpretation and manifestation in the virtual world through 
relative quantification. Think followers, likes, going viral, retweets, shares – all quantifications of 
value; value-investing acts by participants in the virtual world. 
The absolute qualities have become relative quantities.  
From the perspective of an Internet-participant the evaluating is privatized and absolute 
in congruence with the sovereign self who identifies him- or herself with what is virtually 
encountered. Therefore, the way truth is perceived and found in the virtual world, which comes-
to-pass on the ground of aesthetic rapture, transforms the essence of truth.  
What is Being-with-in-the-virtual-world? Looking at Heidegger’s exploration of the 
phenomenon of world sheds light on what I understand as Being-with-in… 
 
 Being-with-in-the-virtual-world. 
 
Heidegger started off  analyses of the structure of relations that make up world by postulating 
the existentiale that is essentially Dasein’s concern as Being-in-the-world. In this paragraph we 
come back to Being-in-the-world. In doing so, we’ve come full hermeneutical circle… But this 
time, instead of taking off from Dasein’s ontical proximity to Things ‘invested with value’, 
Heidegger approaches Being-in-the-world from the ontologico-existential constituents of 
involvement and significance. 
How are these constituents laid out in Being & Time? 
Heidegger begins paragraph 17 by reiterating his claim regarding the ontological 
structure of references and contrasting it to the grammatical  S = P structure of reference: “we 
have indicated that the state which is constitutive for the ready-to-hand as equipment is one of 
reference or assignment. But the ‘indicating’ of the sign and the ‘hammering’ of the hammer are not 
properties of entities.”36  This means that serviceability  is a reference, and not something a thing 
possesses in any case, but “rather the condition (so far as Being is in question) which makes it 
                                                          
36 Martin Heidegger, Being & Time, translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, Blackwell 1985, p. 
114/115 
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possible for the character of such an entity to be defined by its appropriateness. But what, then, is 
“reference” or “assignment” to mean?”37 
The Being of the ready-to-hand, which has the structure of reference, has in itself the 
character of having been referred. 38 Heidegger goes from the present tense – for this structure is 
visible whenever one interacts with equipment in the here and now – to taking its character of 
having been referred in the past-perfect tense, because the Being of the ready-to-hand makes 
that any equipment must have already found its place within the world, otherwise the 
equipment would not be ready-to-hand at all.  
 
Referring as an ontological structure is a how, which in turns makes up the what (the ontical 
appropriateness) of the entity in question.39 Keep in mind that neither are properties of the 
entity, i.e. predicates of the subject; there is – ontologically – a letting the entity be taken as 
involved with another entity in… Hence Heidegger concludes with regards the structure of 
reference: “With any such (discovered –RB) entity there is an involvement which it has in 
something.  The character of Being that belongs to the ready-to-hand is just such an involvement. If 
something has an involvement, this implies letting it be involved in something. The relationship of 
the “with… in…” shall be indicated by the term “assignment” or “reference”.”40 So we have the with-
in from within-the-world elucidated as reference, with world forthcoming as relational 
significance, which is a structure made visible by the different kinds of involvement or 
with…in…, that together form a chain which is ultimately or originally anchored in a “for-the-
sake-of-which”.  
 This with-in of Being-with-in-the-virtual worlds means just that: involvement. Between 
man, the Internet, and his privatized virtual world. 
 
Involvement is not an ontical assertion about an entity, but an ontological relation between 
entities that in relating it to other entities is a definitive characteristic of the Being of such an 
entity.41 The involvement-structure goes like this: I am writing on a computer (with-which), in 
the Royal Library (in-which),  in order to produce a thesis (in-order-to),which is aimed at 
thinking the ‘the Internet’ (towards-this) for the sake of concluding my study (for-the-sake-of-
which). Each moment of my existence, any activity I engage in is structured in terms of these 
involvements,  thus constituting a ‘fork in my road’ where I choose a way to be, whereby my 
past, current projects and future possibilities are laid bare, which is essentially bound up with 
                                                          
37 Ibid. p. 115 
38 Ibid. p. 115 
39 Ibid. p. 115 
40 Ibid. p. 115 
41 Ibid. p. 116 
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the way in which other entities are made intelligible to me. Why? –Because “the ‘for-the-sake-of’ 
always pertains to the Being of Dasein, for which, in its Being, that very Being is essentially and 
issue.” 42 How? –Because every ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ is the base structure of an equipment-
defining totality of involvements that reflect a possible way for me to factically be-in-the-world.  
 
The ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ is the origin out of which the totality of involvements rolls out. So an 
involvement is nothing meaningful and intelligible taken on its own , but is a relation that as a 
relation between entities determines those entities as relata, i.e. letting them be involved with 
each other in a certain way. The different kinds of involvement constitute an ever-widening, 
ever-deepening network of intelligibility that at the base is a for-the-sake-of-which, which 
constitutes the totality of involvements: the result being a large-scale network of interconnected 
relational significance – giving rise to the ontological phenomenon of world.   
Heidegger points out the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’  is a final ‘towards-which’ that lies at the 
base of the totality of involvements where there is no further involvement possible, because it 
relates to an entity which “is not entity with the kind of Being that belongs to what is ready-to-
hand within a world; it is rather an entity whose Being is defined as Being-in-the-world, and to 
whose state of Being, worldhood itself belongs.”43 What could this entity be? –Who else but you 
and me? So, the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ is where Dasein and the world are nearest one another. 
It is the deepest kind of ‘involvement’, relating two different kinds of Being; that of Dasein as 
Being-in-the-world to that of equipment ready-to-hand within-the-world. This final involvement 
is therefore an interconnection, ‘inter’ signifying the different kinds of Being that are connected, 
“by which the structure of involvement leads to Dasein’s  very Being.”44 
 
The structure of involvement leads to Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. So what does Being-with-in-
the-virtual-world mean? Here, too, at the base there is Dasein. Its clicks and queries, its 
circumspective disclosures are the signs and references that make up its virtual world. However, 
each private Dasein is itself the constitutive sign around which all Dasein has disclosed in the 
virtual world with queries congregates, with all possible involvements that come with this 
privately disclosed territory.  
 
The ontological relationship between Dasein and world can be characterized as 
disclosing/disclosedness of entities for-which; this ‘for’ being Dasein and ‘which’ being our 
concern. How does this disclosing relate to the way “for which entities within-the-world are 
                                                          
42 Ibid. p. 117 
43 Ibid. p. 116 
44 Ibid. p. 117 
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proximally freed must have been previously disclosed?”45 It relates to the act of understanding, on 
the precondition that to Dasein’s Being, an understanding of Being belongs.46  
We will need to get into view how the disclosing of world works. We can do so by relating 
involvement and significance to understanding.  
The understanding of world amounts to understanding the context of relations, i.e. the 
possible ways we interact the entities within-the-world that have been freed up or previously 
disclosed – for what? –For possible ways of interaction; involvement and significance. This 
freeing up/disclosing amounts to the possibility that Dasein lets entities be involved, which is 
grounded in our understanding of how these entities can be involved,  which goes back to a ‘for-
the-sake-of-which’ – as the potentiality-for-Being which Dasein itself is and wherefrom Dasein 
assigns itself to an ‘in-order-to’.47 Any such chain of involvements has to be disclosed with a 
certain intelligibility or understanding, before the shackles of the chain link up in any significant 
way. However, the place wherein the involvements go about their way, is “that wherein Dasein 
understands itself beforehand in the mode of assigning itself. The “wherein” of an act of 
understanding which assigns or refers itself, is that for which one lets entities be encountered in the 
kind of Being that belongs to involvements; and this “wherein” is the phenomenon of the world.”48 
 In the act of understanding, we disclose that wherein entities can be made intelligible. 
But this disclosing likewise entails the coming into view of the phenomenon of world, due to the 
act’s assigning or referring itself, which ultimately anchors in a ‘for-the-sake-of-which’. 
 What is Dasein’s assigning itself ontologically? It is the act of understanding that holds 
the different relations in the open, in disclosedness, so that through this openness the 
assignment can operate. Understanding is both the disclosing as well as the disclosedness. “The 
relational character which these relationships signify, we take as one of signifying.”49 This 
signifying, taking its leave with Dasein, goes together with the totality of involvements. Together 
they constitute a primordial totality: they are, as structures of signifying, originally to be 
understood by Dasein as Being-in-the-world, albeit tacitly. “This relational totality of signifying 
we call “significance”. Dasein, in its familiarity with significance, is the ontical condition for the 
possibility of discovering entities which are encountered in a world with involvement (readiness-to-
hand) as their kind of Being.”50 But Dasein’s familiarity with significance is the ontological 
condition for Dasein to understand; to take entities as. 
 
 Conclusion: Being-with-in-the-virtual-world.  
                                                          
45 Ibid. p. 118 
46 Ibid. p. 118 
47 Ibid. p. 119 
48 Ibid. p. 119 
49 Ibid. p. 120 
50 Ibid. p. 120 
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The Being of the ready-to-hand as involvement is structured by defining these involvements as a 
context of assignments or references, and in so doing, the phenomenon of world has come into 
view.  
In the virtual this network of relational significance congregates around its constitutive 
sign with-in-the-virtual-world; you. You, me, every private person is a constitutive sign on its 
own. Each constitutive sign adheres to the different kinds of involvement in its own specific way, 
just as the structure of involvements is tailored to individual Dasein living in a ‘we’-world. The 
difference is the virtual world is a billion ‘me’-worlds together privately. In the end, involvement 
is likewise the interconnection between two entities: a private person and the Internet. 
Regarding my thesis-claim, we need to understand the way world is disclosed, because if 
we are to think how truth comes-to-pass in the virtual world we must lay out how the disclosing 
of world works. We do that by looking at mood and state-of-mind as Being-there. When we get 
that into view, we look at how the understanding distinct to the virtual world transforms the 
way truth is found and perceived. 
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IV 
Aesthetic rapture and oblivion. 
 
The most striking contrast between the ‘real’ world and the virtual world is this: the virtual 
world is virtual exactly because, as a world, it is both visible and tangible, which is a 
characteristic unheard of with regard to a phenomenon. But it’s easy to see, that, as a structure 
of involvements and significance, in its involving and referring the virtual world is operated with 
touch and sight by its participants, the users of the Internet. It likewise means that these 
ontological constituents of world have themselves become equipment in the Ready-to-hand, 
experienced in a private sense via smartphone and computer, hooked up to the Internet, through 
which we reside with-in the referential structure of the virtual world.  
Let’s investigate the Being-there as state-of-mind and Dasein’s Being-attuned as how the 
world is disclosed primordially, while along the way contrasting it to the attunement or mood 
distinct to the virtual world and the way world is disclosed through it. 
 
 The ‘there’ distinct to the virtual world. 
 
By definition of the unitary phenomenon of Being-in-the-world, Being-in… can never signify a 
subject-object relation, for this would be a dichotomy that cannot be grounded in a common 
origin where they are atoned.51 In dividing categorically, the ‘between’ can never be found, 
because the phenomenon is split asunder beforehand and thereafter put together, usually by 
positing some first being like God. Heidegger’s stake is not splitting the phenomenon, but “to 
keep its positive phenomenal content secure.”52 This positive content is shown in Heidegger’s 
‘there’. 
So how is this ‘between’ of man and world found in the ‘there’ of Being-there as state-of-
mind? –In the ‘there’ man and world meet up in a primordial way. How? The ‘there’ has 
disclosing power to open up world as a realm of meaning wherein Dasein moves and orients 
itself.  
Dasein, “the entity which is essentially constituted by Being-in-the-world is itself in every 
case its ‘there’.”53 If there is a ‘there’, there is likewise a ‘here’ and a ‘yonder’. The ‘here’ is Dasein 
is to be understood in relation to a ‘yonder’ Ready-to-hand, “in the sense of a Being towards this 
‘yonder’ – a Being that is de-severant, directional and concernful.“  So, in a sense, the ‘here’ 
                                                          
51 Ibid. p. 170 
52 Ibid. p. 170 
53 Ibid. p. 171 
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belongs to man, i.e. our location in the world and the ‘yonder’ indicates our orientation in the 
world, an orientation guided in turn by “something encountered within-the-world”54 
Only out of the ‘there’, can there be a ‘here’ and ‘yonder’55. What is this ‘there’? –“In the 
expression ‘there’ we have in view this essential disclosedness. By reason of this disclosedness, this 
entity (Dasein), together with the Being-there of the world, is ‘there’ for itself.” 
 
What ‘there’ is distinct to the virtual world? –How does Dasein find itself with-in-the-virtual-
world? By what is its ‘there’ constituted? Dasein finds himself taken ‘there’ by aesthetic rapture. 
What is aesthetic rapture? –Aesthetic rapture is the ‘there’ through which man and virtual world 
are disclosed. However, paradoxically, this ‘there’ – taking into account the meaning of rapture – 
likewise entails a being here and being taken over yonder. So the disclosing of the virtual world 
also and always entails an enclosing. You need two worlds to make possible rapturing. You need 
the world you find yourself in, always and already as Being-in-the-world, and you need the 
virtual world, which has the Being of Being-with-in-the-virtual world.  
How does this rapturing take place? Via the aesthetic, meaning; from sensory perceptions 
emanating from the virtual world through the Internet as significations, notifications, buzzes, 
pings. We are so attunement to the Internet, that every time the virtual world comes to call we 
respond without reservation, hesitation or contemplation on these sensory perceptions 
emanating from private-equipment, in whose answering we are drawn with-in the virtual world.  
For each signification from the virtual world signifies something new – however uninteresting 
though it may be; it’s always new. Novelty shines titillating through the screen… Are you not 
curious when your phone buzzes what this signification might mean to you? –Of course you are. 
You are, as are I, curious enough to stop what you are doing and drawn toward the novelty 
awaiting to be revealed with the touch of your hand. Novelty means: to be and stay distracted in 
the moment. 
 
Heidegger claims: “Dasein is its disclosedness.” 56 Dasein’s sense of meaning (how) is guided by 
our perceptions of what we encounter as disclosed within-the-world. The fact we sense meaning 
in our perceiving is an indication as to the truth of Heidegger’s proposition.  
If Dasein is its disclosedness, which, with regard to Being-in… means openness towards 
world – taken as a realm of historical meaning and future possibilities disclosed in the ‘there’ – 
wherein Dasein exists, how does Dasein’s disclosing/disclosedness relate to the virtual world 
and its distinct ‘there’? The disclosedness of aesthetic rapture is in every case Dasein’s own, 
meaning: it is a privatized disclosedness, for the rapturing happens between Dasein and its 
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55 Ibid. p. 171 
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interaction with the Internet and participation with-in the virtual world. What does this 
privatization mean?  
Example: ten people are sitting in a classroom discoursing upon a subject. The 
disclosedness of this discourse is shared by those ten people. Now imagine ten people sitting in a 
classroom, all of them with phone under their thumb and eyes fixed upon the screen. They are 
engaged with the virtual world, a world which in each case is disclosed to them privately. 
Although they be together, they are ‘miles apart’ and in different worlds altogether, they are de-
severed in their private way, have their own directionality and are privately engaged in their 
own concernful dealings. They have been raptured, taken from their shared proximally closest 
‘we-world’57 and raptured, via the aesthetic, to the virtual world.  
The aesthetic rapture distinct to Dasein’s being taken away with-in-the-virtual-world, 
aims to keep us with-in-the-virtual-world by grappling for our attention and time by keeping our 
senses fixed on private-equipment, hooked up to world-disclosing-equipment, disclosing our 
virtual world to us. 
 
However, Rapture is also a prophetic word in the sense of being taken by the prima causa and 
called ‘home’ via ascending into bliss – permanently. Is it possible to think aesthetic rapture as a 
word of prophecy? As a bridge between two worlds, which, after the other side’s been reached 
dissolves behind those raptured – permanently? What origin beckons us thither? What one thing 
has the capacity to gather us in rapture in such a way? What’s happening right here, right now? 
 
To recap: the ‘there’ is the primordial manner in which ‘here’ (man) and ‘yonder’ (world) are 
originally atoned. The being of the ‘there’ is constituted by state-of-mind and understanding58 – 
these two constituents of the ‘there’ are equiprimordial and disclose world in the most 
fundamental manner, namely through discourse59 as being able of being understood as a 
structural complexity of involvements and relational significance revealed by language, signs 
and references.  
 
 The state-of-mind engendered by the disclosing of the virtual world through aesthetic 
rapture. 
 
State-of-mind is the ontological term for what ontically is familiar to us as the mood we find 
ourselves in.60  
                                                          
57 Ibid. p. 93 
58 Ibid. p. 171/172 
59 Ibid. p. 172 
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 We move from mood to state-of-mind (‘there’) as follows: “A mood makes manifest ‘how 
one is, and how one is faring’. In this  ‘how one is’, having a mood brings Being to its ‘there’.” 61 
Dasein is its ‘there’ in such a way that Dasein finds itself in a state-of-mind which brings Dasein 
before itself, in the sense of finding itself in the mood it is in. But this finding is not a directed 
seeking on the part of Dasein, but rather, this finding is more oft than not turning-away.  
 “It is always by way of a state-of-mind that this turning-away is what it is.”62 This is 
quintessential with regard the state-of-mind distinct to the virtual world. Aesthetic rapture’s the 
mood that makes us turn away from whatever concern we attend to within-the-world, by being 
drawn to another. Such is the nature of rapture. But what does the state-of-mind distinct to the 
virtual world turn us away from? –From the ‘real’ world. We turn away from it; become 
oblivious to it. All de-severing and directionality is nowadays achieved through the Internet and 
the virtual world. These constituents of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world are mediated via the 
Internet. This ultimately leads to an oblivion so deep that we will lose our traditional sense of 
self, world – and truth. Because the Internet changes the way we sense meaning. But no ending 
comes without new beginnings… A new sensibility lurks in the virtual, but it takes more than 
20k words to think it with footnotes and references, so that sensibility we will just have to let 
lurk. 
 There are three6364 aspects to states-of-mind, but we will focus on one: 
- Circumspection. Disclosedness permits beforehand what can be encountered within-
the-world. It has the character of becoming affected65, because Being-in as Being-
there discloses what can be encountered in such a way that it matters to us. “The fact 
that this sort of thing can “matter” to it is grounded in one’s state-of-mind.”66 With 
openness to world constituted by our attunement to a state-of-mind, the senses gain 
an ontological depth, because only because we are in-the-world with a state-of-mind 
– not just accidentally, but necessarily – can our senses “be ‘touched’ or can we ‘have a 
sense for’”67 something in such a way that it matters.  
The state-of-mind makes plain that entities wherewith we concern ourselves within-the-
world matter to us. 
 
 Conclusion: oblivion & aesthetic rapture. 
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64 Ibid. p. 176 
65 Ibid. p. 176 
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The state-of-mind that belongs to the Internet I call oblivion, because although the virtual world 
is disclosed as aesthetic rapture, this in turn, on the basis of the private relation to the world-
disclosing-equipment called Internet, achieved by sensing via private-equipment of smartphone 
and P.C., leads to oblivion with world and the privatization of evaluative standards.  
We do not care anymore what happens way ‘out there’, out of our immediate grasp, we 
just care to be taken away, raptured, bombarded with novelty and beauty, right here, right now.  
Taken away so we can be with-in-the-virtual-world. The Internet and the virtual world it 
discloses achieves this for us, but this achievement comes at a price: it entails the private 
enclosing of Dasein in the ‘real’ world through the disclosedness of aesthetic rapture distinct to 
the virtual world. Words like “information-bubble” and “echo-chamber” approach this 
phenomenon of virtual disclosing as private enclosing. They also indicate its consequence: the 
privatization of truth.  
Oblivion as a state-of-mind renders world by virtue of a  technologically engendered 
solipsism. There is no world outside what you have disclosed and what is fed to you on the basis 
of your clicks and queries. Disclosed are the things that matter to you – and nothing else 
matters…  
With all constituents now laid out and explained, we can turn our attention on what is 
happening right here and now: the privatization of truth.  
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V 
The privatization of truth 
 
“Everything we hear is an opinion, not a fact. 
Everything we see is a perspective, not the truth.” 
-Marcus Aurelius.68 
 
 
 The privatization of truth. 
 
What is the privatization of truth? We have a process in privatization and a phenomenon in 
truth, that both need elucidating.  
(1): what is privatization and (2): what is truth? 
We’ve seen how the Internet is encountered primarily through private-equipment and 
therefore that the virtual world is experienced in a private sense. The private disclosing is 
achieved via aesthetic rapture: the particular mood that assails us and attunes us with-in the 
virtual world. We’ve seen how this disclosing in turn constitutes the state-of-mind that discloses 
world nowadays as oblivion – which is properly thought of as a private enclosing. This happens 
due to the primacy of disclosing and revealing via queries and clicks, the particular way 
(aletheuein as Heidegger would say) pertaining to the virtual world. This has changed the way 
truth is found and perceived – and will ultimately constitute the opening up of a new domain for 
truth itself. Quite a claim… 
 My claim is set in relief against the background of a belief: that with the arrival of the 
Internet as world-disclosing-equipment and the privately experienced virtual world it 
engenders, Heidegger’s warning in The Question Concerning Technology regarding the primacy of 
the way of revealing (aletheuein) distinct to modern technology, namely that it will make us 
“lose access to the primal truth”69, is coming to fruition presently. Why? –Because modern 
technology labours to nullify time and space70, I dare say the Internet, which enables 
information-exchange with the speed of light and always resides within arm’s length through 
private-equipment, is its crowning achievement thus far. 
 
                                                          
68 This quote circulates since 2015 on social media – it’s false: Marcus Aurelius never wrote it. Who cares? 
Privately evaluate that… 
69 Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, translated by William Lovitt 
Harper and Row 1977, p. 28 
70 Martin Heidegger, Over denken, bouwen, wonen translated by H.M. Berghs, Sun 1999, p. 66 
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The way of revealing prevalent nowadays is often heard as the answer to any question: “just 
google it!” When you have a question, your first thought is not about whatever is in question, but 
your immediate reaction is to google it, see what is revealed or disclosed by your query and take 
it from there by clicking. On the one hand it’s like outsourcing the revealing-process, and so 
outsourcing bringing-forth a myriad of possible outcomes to choose from in what is revealed 
and referred to, while on the other hand holding the results of what our ‘thinking’ – the query 
regarding whatever is in question – has revealed, as achieved by us. This is evidenced by the 
equally often heard remark when someone espouses what they think on whatever matter: 
“that’s my truth!” 
“Just google it” and “that’s my truth”… The first concerning the way truth is found, 
outsourcing the revealing process, the second to the way truth is perceived, as private; as 
something you own or make your own. Truth as private property? How does such ownership of 
truth come about?  
Platitudes are revealing by virtue of being common to the parlance of the times. They 
reveal by killing off discourse – paradoxically. It is like hitting a wall once someone utters them. 
And precisely beyond is where the realm of philosophy begins, as the unspeakable that awaits 
utterance.  When platitudes are invoked they point toward a phenomenon ‘beyond the wall’, that 
has itself not yet been brought out into the open. 
These two platitudes together make up the coin that forms the privatization of truth: (1); 
the way of revealing and circumspective disclosure achieved by queries and clicks and (2): the 
results of this revealing being privately appropriated as true in a privately disclosed domain. 
What is most interesting is what happens in between: for it is not man that reveals, but orders 
up the revealing of whatever is in question by querying the virtual world, yet man claims this 
revealing and subsequent appropriation of what is uncovered as his own, as if he revealed, 
uncovered and established as true whatever he asserted by bringing it out into his open – in 
truth. 
 
 What is privatization? 
 
Privatization is the process by which what was hitherto publicly shared becomes privately 
owned. The term is particularly prevalent in economics and has been since the early ‘80’s. 
Almost all resources of planet Earth have been carved up this way, as well as most domains of 
life, except what has not yet been disclosed as possible domain of exploitation. Everyone is a 
privatized resource in a sense. How and why? –Everybody is owned by his/her debtors and debt 
itself comes into Being out of nothing – yet another way of privatization.  
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Since the financial crisis we have become acutely unaware (due to novelty) that we are born into 
debt and never get out of this hole. The financial crisis came down to a tremendous private debt 
that was collectivized so that the private ownership of resources and debt owed to banks by 
private persons could be sustained and maintained. The paradoxical irony of this cannot be 
overstated. As a consequence of previous crises people started robbing banks, but nowadays 
banks rob the people, by imposing their private debt collectively upon us and holding this debt 
over our heads – as far as they are concerned –  into perpetuity. We are owned in collective debt 
obligation to the same institution we bailed out by taking on its private debt, without reciprocal 
accountability or obligation. Now, I’m not going into this any further, save to say this: 
privatization is a one-way street. Once initiated, the die is cast. There will be another crisis – 
with either a bigger, better bail-out or a total collapse of the world economy and the global 
conflicts that come with such a catastrophe. 
All privatization, whether it is recourses, people’s mortgage-debt or printing money, i.e. 
creating debt out of thin air, commences with an original theft. Privatization deprives what was 
previously collectively shared and accessible by denying access to it, by laying claim to it. With 
people’s mortgage they put up their productivity over 20+ year periods, thereby privatizing 
themselves with regard to their debtor, while the debtor puts up a theoretical value against this; 
money/debt.  
 
 Aletheia 
 
Aletheia  is formed from lethe, meaning concealment – or oblivion – and the alpha privans-prefix 
“a-“; making it its opposite: not concealment but uncoveredness, not oblivion but remembrance. 
It means to deprive of concealmeant; to rob from oblivion. Privare in Latin means to rob; to 
make your own.  
Techne is man’s authentic way of revealing , to which philosophy, whose handicraft 
moves in the dimension of logos, pertains. Techne is an aletheuein; way of bringing out into the 
open. In this sense “robbery” pertains to Heidegger’s phenomenological reading of truth as 
aletheia. It is taken as the process of disclosing what is hidden by depriving it from oblivion and 
bringing it into the world. It is a revealing. But the robbing achieved by the privatization of truth 
attacks exactly Heidegger’s notion of robbery – like a universal acid. For everything previously 
disclosed, that was collectively shared and understood as within-the-world, with unifying 
standards of evaluation for what the true, the good and the beautiful are, is being torn asunder 
by privatization. The robbery privatization achieves is an enclosing of the original disclosedness, 
which will lead to its being closed off for good – the oblivion of world. This state-of-mind is 
presently already the prevailing one. Even truth itself, taken as the original domain cleared in for 
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the western world’s destining, its potentiality-for-Being, will become out of bounds for us 
eventually… So what is this primordial domain that Heidegger sought out and was still able to 
reach? 
 
 What is truth?  
 
You can fill libraries with answers to this question and still not have accumulated in volume the 
qualitative richness and profundity of the primordial source. But as I claim: the way has been 
outsourced, barring us access to the primordial source or the source itself has been depleted 
same as a mine runs out of resources, wherefore the way needed to be outsourced. I will confine 
myself to Heidegger’s reading of truth as aletheia in Being and Time § 44, for it stands to reason 
that his warning must be read as his interpretation of access to the domain of truth, as well as 
what truth itself is. 
 
As a background to this analysis of the way truth is found and what truth is and my subsequent 
contrasting it with the virtual world’s way of revealing, a historical embedding is needed to show 
what is happening on the foreground; a happening which manifests itself as the privatization of 
truth.  
The potentiality of the becoming and destining of western culture was given its breadth 
and impetus by the Ancient Greeks, who thought the archetypes of philosophy by providing the 
first answers to the original question of our tradition as defined by Aristotle: “ti to on tis he 
ousia?” 
This question guides the Grand Style of western culture, which I define – taking into 
account Aristotle’s definition of man as the being that lives aided by technique and language – as 
knowledge (logos) through technology (techne). Therefore, western culture has a strong drive to 
a certain kind truth, where knowledge is ascertained in a secure way – but what kind of truth 
does this drive aim at and stem from? What counts as knowledge or what we take as true 
regarding things is how we can handle things, what we can do with them; in their potentiality for 
interaction with us, we find the domain (aletheia) wherein the being shows itself as is. All that 
we take the western world to be is engendered by this first question, that has had a tremendous 
potentiality for answers over time. But the source is depleted; the impetus has ground to a hold. 
–Or has it? Well, it is the post-truth era, something is amiss. But maybe we are just in a 
convergence – a tipping point? Does the first question shed some light on what has hitherto 
remained hidden concerning this question; does this question have a flipside? 
What is the being qua being? For short, this is the question concerning the thing. But this 
question, as I claim in the conclusion of this aphorism, is but one side of the philosophical medal, 
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for this question which asks after the being can only be asked if man is aware of his separation 
from the being, yet understand himself related to it via shared origin. Hence the other side 
contains the question: what is man?  
What is man? Is man a what or is man a who? And is this “who” to be questioned as a 
sovereign self – or is the proper question perhaps: who are we?   
 
Heidegger noticed that “the expression ‘truth’ can be used as term for ‘entity’ and “Being’.”71 Of 
course, this distinction plays and comes to deployment  in Heidegger’s ontological difference. 
Therefore, he asks: “What ontico-ontological connection (entity-Being – RB) does ‘truth’ have with 
Dasein and with that ontical characteristic we call the “understanding of Being”? Can the reason 
why Being necessarily goes together with truth and vice versa be pointed out in terms of such 
understanding?”72 Traditionally, three theses have been presupposed as to what truth is, how it 
is found and where it happens. 
(1): the ‘locus’ of truth is assertion; judgement, (2):  its essence lies in the agreement or 
corresponding of the judgement with its object, (3): that Aristotle first proposed these 
definitions of truth as agreement, with as its ‘locus’ the judgement.73  
 
Heidegger starts off with this traditional set of theses (constituting the presence-at-hand mode 
of Being) to show how, where and when the subjectivist tendency began deploying itself; by 
locating truth in the judgement. –Why? Because a judgement can only come from someone who 
utters it; truth is therefore not outside of us, but in us – awaiting utterance (verba dicendi – logos; 
speaking)74. It is the object that reflects the judgement uttered as corresponding or agreeing 
with its content, which links up via its outward appearance to the idea represented in the mind’s 
eye. So, who looks and how (orthotes – theoria; looking)75 is the quintessence of the subject-
object dichotomy. The subject (as underlying) is taken as constitutive for the object, by 
conditioning beforehand how it can possibly be made available for us as an object. In short, the 
dichotomy is a ‘how’ that structures the possibility of a ‘what’. But what standard of evaluation is 
coupled to it? It places truth-value on the functionality of the object; what its use is for us, and 
establishes its identity in truth accordingly. 
Aristotle may be wrongly accused76 of being the proponent of defining judgement as the 
locus of truth77, Plato himself stands rightly accused of decisively transforming truth by 
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72 Ibid. p. 256 
73 Ibid. p. 257 
74 Gerard Visser, Nietzsche & Heidegger, SUN 1989, p. 156 
75 Ibid. p. 156 
76 Martin Heidegger, Being & Time, translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, Blackwell 1985, p. 
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devaluating art to mimesis in Politeia because it lacks functionality, i.e. serviceability.78  This put 
the weight of truth in the subject’s capacity for judgement-making, a logical procedure which 
evaluates the object on the grounds of its functionality. It crowned the logical, dispassionate, 
turned-away-from-the-body-state-of-mind as the sovereign of truth. This tipped the scales in 
favour of subjectivism – and cleared the way for it to flourish the way it did (with Descartes as 
its most radical proponent) and still does in the form of what we call modern technology.  
 
Heidegger alludes to Aristotle’s supposed definition of truth. This assertion, that the soul’s 
(mind’s eye) representations are likenings of things79, was consequently transposed in Latin as 
“the essence of truth as adequation intellectus et rei.”80 This assertion turned definition was able 
to hold its own even in the neo-Kantian epistemology, that “often characterized this definition of 
“truth” as an expression of methodologically retarded naïve realism, and declared it to be 
irreconcilable with Kant’s ‘Copernican revolution.”81 But Kant never brought this definition into 
question, instead, he presupposes it as a given, stating: “Truth and illusion are not in the object so 
far as it is intuited, but in the judgement so far as it is thought.”82 
Because this line of thought does not bring us anywhere phenomenologically or 
ontologically, Heidegger asks: “What else is tacitly posited in this relational totality of the 
adequatio intellectus et rei?” What is adequatio? –It means ‘agreement’. What is agreement? –
“The agreement of something with something (note: two times ‘something’, signifying we  have a 
relation between entities, a subject-object relation, i.e. presence-at-hand –RB) has the formal 
relation of something to something. Every agreement, and therefore ‘truth’ as well, is a relation. 
But not every relation is an agreement.” –Indeed, because the relation of disagreement, of an 
assertion judged regarding an entity that is proven wrong, is likewise a relation, namely the 
negative of the relation of agreement. – But also in this sense: “A sign points at what is indicated. 
Such indicating is a relation, but not an agreement of  the sign with what is indicated.”83 
The question is: “With regard to what do intellectus and res agree? If it is  impossible for 
intelletus and res to be equal because  they are not of the same species, are they perhaps similar?” 
84Yet, knowledge (taken as judgements proven true) claims it ‘gives’ the thing in question ‘just 
as’ it is.85 But does it, if we think it in the sense of the subject-object dichotomy? –No, because of 
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78 I use functionality and serviceability interchangeably.  
79 Martin Heidegger, Being & Time, translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, Blackwell 1985, p. 
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80 Ibid. p. 257 
81 Ibid. p. 258 
82 Ibid. p. 258 
83 Ibid. p. 258 
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the preconditioning of what can be the object of knowledge that is implied in this sense (its ‘how’ 
is a derivative of the primordial source). 
So the real question has pointed us toward the “’epistemological’ problematic as regards  
the subject-Object relation” itself, with its “immanent consciousness of truth”, which remains 
“’within the sphere’ of the subject?“ 
This problematic is one that  unfolds in the two layers implied in judgement and 
knowledge; taken on the one hand as a “Real psychical process, and that which is judged, as an 
ideal content. Of the latter it will be said that it is true.” Why? –Because what is true is knowledge, 
yet knowledge is judging. According to opinion the ideal content stands in a relation of 
agreement. But of what kind? –Of the presence-at-hand  kind. The connection is one between 
content and the “Real thing as that which is judged about. How are we to take ontologically the 
relation between an ideal entity and something that is Real and present-at-hand? Such a relation 
indeed subsists; and in factical (Heidegger introduces temporality into the ‘how’; the ascertaining 
of knowledge –RB) judgement and the Real Object, but likewise as a relation between the ideal 
content and the Real act of judgement.”86 
 
Now we move into what the ‘subsisting’ of said relation consists of in the ontological sense. Is 
there perhaps a domain out of which this relation arose, that would make the term ‘subsisting’ 
ontologically one that corresponds across two levels of Being?87 What needs to be done to clarify 
the kind of Being that belongs to adequatio, is clarifying which kind of Being belongs to 
knowledge itself. Only if this structure is elucidated properly, can the phenomenon of truth – “a 
phenomenon (…) characteristic of knowledge”88 – come into view. Truth becomes phenomenally 
explicit in knowledge when “such knowing demonstrates itself as true”89, thereby assuring itself 
of its truth. So how does the demonstrating work, that shows us the relation of adequatio? 
Heidegger uses the example of a picture hanging on the wall, of which someone, who is 
with his back turned to the wall asserts it is hanging askew.90 Only after the man turns round 
and actually perceives the picture hanging askew, has the truth of his assertion been assured as 
true. There is confirmation of the assertion – and the asserting itself is related to the real picture 
on the wall, and nothing else. Therefore, “asserting is a way of Being towards the Thing itself that 
is. And what does one’s perceiving of it demonstrates? Nothing else that this Thing is the very entity 
which one has in mind in one’s assertion.”91 –So we have in assertion a Being towards the entity 
itself; thus what is to be confirmed or demonstrated is that this Being uncovers the entity 
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90 Ibid. p. 260 
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40 
 
towards it is ‘directed’. “What gets demonstrated is the Being-uncovering of the assertion.” But the 
knowing remains solely related to that entity towards which the assertion made is directed, and 
this entity enacts the confirmation by showing itself just as it is in itself; “that is to say, it shows 
itself that it, in its self-sameness, is just as it gets pointed out in the assertion as being – just as it 
gets uncovered as being.” 92 
Assertion is a pointing towards an entity (same as signs indicate or point towards 
entities, but do not agree with them), taken as ‘such and such as being the case’; demonstrating 
shows such and such indeed being so, enacting it via confirmation. “Confirmation,” therefore,  
“signifies the entity’s showing itself in its selfsameness.” And the demonstration solely pertains to  
“the Being-uncovered of the entity itself – that entity in the ‘how’ of its uncoveredness.”93 Therefore, 
the Being-true of an assertion must be taken as Being-uncovering. With this Heidegger breaks 
through the subject-object-dichotomy, for truth in this sense “has by no means the structure of an 
agreement between knowing the object in the sense of a likening of one entity (the subject) to 
another (the Object).”94 Instead, what emerges in this breakthrough is a domain of unhiddennes 
(aletheia), wherein  truth comes-to-pass as something temporal, in the sense of entities at a 
certain point being brought out into the open (aletheia) by way of the revealing facilitated by 
signs, thereby disclosing these hitherto hidden entities, which thereafter become available for 
circumspection within-the-world. 
Therefore, Being-true as Being-uncovering is possible only on the basis of Being-in-the-
world.95 Accordingly, the privatization of truth, taken as Being-true as Being-uncovering is 
possible as a relationship between assertion, demonstration, confirmation  knowledge only on 
the basis of Being-with-in-the-virtual-world. But with-in-the-virtual-world this entire relational 
totality – of men making assertions and ascertaining knowledge by way of demonstration – is 
privatized as is the inversion of Heidegger’s sense of Being-uncovered as disclosedness within-
the-world. Within-in the virtual world, we establish identity by identifying ourselves with the 
entity in question – by private standards of aesthetic evaluation. –Do you ‘like’ it… or not?  
 –Let’s follow this up, to see if in Heidegger’s sense the primordial phenomenon of truth, 
which is based up Being-in-the-world, can likewise be captured in the virtual – thus private –
sense. I think so: all I am saying of Heideggerian truth with relation to the privatization of truth 
constitutes an inversion, a reversal of what has been previously disclosed into private enclosure 
and eventual oblivion, pertaining to my fundamental belief: that access to the primordial source 
of truth is lost as indicated by the post-truth era (either by depletion of the source– or by out-
sourcing the way and transposing the relational totality of ascertaining knowledge upon the 
                                                          
92 Ibid. p. 260 
93 Ibid. p. 260 
94 Ibid. p. 260 
95 Ibid. p. 260 
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virtual world, a totality now constituting the private disclosedness with-in-the-virtual-world). 
The unhiddenness itself, a clearing opened up by the Greeks’ wonderment with the original 
question, whose answering unveiled to them the archetypes of philosophy will be closed-off and 
sink into oblivion; only to reopen radically anew, clearing in a domain shaped by new archetypes, 
by new forms – a new destining.  
What question, understood in what sense, has the  Form-engendering power to open up 
this clearing? 
 
In section (b) of §44 Heidegger starts exploring the primordial phenomenon of truth in its 
original temporal dimension, after breaking through the subject-object relation as a mere 
derivative by explaining and embedding it within this dimension.  
“Being-true means Being-uncovering.” So there is an activity implied in ‘uncovering’, but 
not the kind pertaining to adequatio, i.e. agreement. So what is Being-true? “Its Being-true is 
aletheuein of taking entities out of their hiddenness and letting them be seen in their unhiddenness. 
The aletheia  signifies what shows itself – entities in the “how”  of their uncoveredness.”96 Now, the 
aletheuein distinct to man’s bringing-forth (poiesis) is techne. Poiesis is counterpart to physis, 
which is the coming up into the open of nature itself, the way nature reveals itself as present-in-
itself. However, man’s way to reveal is techne, which is a bringing-forth into the open – and all 
bringing-forth pertains to poiesis.97 Both are ways entities show themselves as they are in their 
unhiddenness (aletheia). The practice of philosophy likewise pertains to techne, as a bringing-
forth out into the open by means of logos. 
What is unhiddenness or aletheia? Heidegger alludes to a distinction drawn by Heraclitus 
between those who are lacking in understanding of logos, and those who are in understanding of 
it. Logos pertains to how entities comport or show themselves. “To those who are lacking in 
understanding, what they (entities – RB) do remains hidden – lantanei. They forget it 
(epilantanontai); that is, for them it sinks back into hiddenness. Thus to the logos belongs 
unhiddenness – a-letheia.”98 Understanding has to do with knowing how entities comport 
themselves. With logos and aletheia brought together in their primordial relation, Heidegger 
proposes ‘his’ definition of truth as uncoveredness and its aletheieun or method being one of 
bringing-forth into the open by means of logos, stating that in so proposing he hasn’t  “shaken off 
the tradition (of metaphysics in its distinct how of the subject-object relation –RB), but have 
appropriated it primordially; and we shall have done so all the more if we succeed in 
                                                          
96 Ibid. p. 262 
97 Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, translated by William Lovitt, 
Harper and Row 1977, p. 10 
98 Martin Heidegger, Being & Time, translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, Blackwell 1985, p. 
262 
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demonstrating that the idea of agreement (adequatio –RB)  is one to which theory (the disengaged 
looking of the presence-at-hand mode of Being – RB )  had to come on the basis of the primordial 
phenomenon.”99 
With this elucidated, Heidegger starts to connect the dots from the primordial 
phenomenon of truth; aletheia, to Dasein and world, to disclosedness and the “there”. He states: 
“Being-true as Being-uncovering is a way of Being for Dasein. What makes this uncovering possible 
must necessarily be called ‘true’ in a still more primordial sense. Uncovering is a way of Being of 
Being-in-the-world.” After linking up uncovering with Being-in-the-world, Heidegger introduces 
the temporal distinction between Being-uncovering and Being-uncovered in connection to truth; 
“what is primarily ‘true’ – that is, uncovering, is Dasein. “Truth” in the second sense does not mean 
Being-uncovering, but Being-uncovered (uncoveredness).”100So we have a sense of Being-
uncovering as the primordial ‘activity’ of man as a necessary participant in this uncovering. With 
this uncovering coming-to-pass, what is disclosed – or deprived from what is  hidden – by being 
brought-forth into the open becomes circumspective accessible within-the-world. But the 
uncoveredness (acquired through Being-uncovering) of beings within-the-world is grounded in 
the world’s disclosedness, which in turn is the “basic character of Dasein according to which it is 
its “there”. Disclosedness is constituted by state-of-mind, understanding and discourse, and pertains 
equiprimordially to world.”101 And then he moves to link up disclosedness to uncoveredness and 
the “there”: “Only with Dasein’ disclosedness is the most primordial phenomenon of truth attained. 
What we have pointed out earlier with regard to the existential constitution of the “there” (§32) 
and in relation to the everyday Being of the “there” (§33), pertains to the most primordial 
phenomenon of truth, nothing less. In so far as Dasein is its disclosedness essentially, and discloses 
and uncovers as something disclosed to this extent it is essentially ‘true’. Dasein is ‘in truth’.” 
 
Heidegger makes four statements pertaining to Dasein’s past, present, future, and as counterpart 
to Dasein being in truth as standing out in the clearing, the circumference of Dasein being in 
untruth as being enclosed by that original clearing. “(1) To Dasein’s state of Being, disclosedness 
in general belongs. It embraces the whole structure-of-Being.”102 I ask, after giving this analysis of 
disclosedness and the “there”, truth as uncovering/uncoveredness and Dasein being in ‘in truth’: 
What is  Being itself? Being itself is taken by Heidegger as the destining (taken as a becoming 
occasioned by the original clearing shaped by the potentiality of questioning the archetypes over 
time) of world. I think he is right. But  ‘this here’ Being around us has rendered – through its 
destining into oblivion – the potential of another Being emerging ‘over yonder’. I believe It will 
                                                          
99 Ibid. p. 262 
100 Ibid. p. 263 
101 Ibid. p. 263 
102 Ibid. p. 264 
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come to pass through the “there” of aesthetic rapture, which is a rich and multi-layered 
phenomenon. I think it cannot just be rendered as a mood of the virtual world and a state-of-
mind of oblivion in turn pertaining to the way world is enclosed, but also as a gateway between 
two tendencies of destining of ‘this here’ Being and the possibility of Being ‘over yonder’. If I am 
right, the Internet does harbour a future sense of Heideggerian authenticity, once this ‘over 
yonder’ emerges. 
Presently, aesthetic rapture takes us away with-in-the-virtual-world, yet it is already 
transforming how we sense meaning as right here, right now. But it can also be thought as the 
entrance and proving ground to think the virtual world itself as Will to Power-world103, and then 
by looking back at ourselves understand we are presently virtual voyeurs of our own lives in a 
triumphant, formless, boundless, Wagnerian rapture104 – but I will have to leave the other side of 
the looking glass and how we look through it un-thought. For now, we are with-in-the-virtual 
world as falling: “Proximally and for the most part Dasein is lost in its ‘world’. Its absorption in the 
“they” signifies that it is dominated by the way things are publicly interpreted.” Note that the 
“they” in the virtual world is but a reflection of the self and the way things are publicly 
interpreted is privatized but taken as publicly interpreted, because it is encountered with-in-the-
virtual-world. “That which has been uncovered and disclosed stays in a mode in which it has been 
disguised and closed off by idle talk, curiosity  and ambiguity. Being towards entities has been 
uprooted.” In this sense, our Being-towards (the way; aletheuein) entities via the virtual has 
likewise been “uprooted”, what I call out-sourced. “Entities have not been completely hidden, they 
are precisely the sort of thing that has been uncovered, but at the same time disguised. They show 
themselves, but in the mode of semblance.”105 –As we take the way of revealing via clicks and 
queries distinct to the uncovering and uncoveredness of the virtual world, we understand that 
every entity – and the virtual world itself – manifests itself through- and in semblance106. This 
makes it virtually impossible to distinguish between what is true and untrue; and this 
impossibility in turn renders truth as a constitutive value for the virtual world – and in turn 
                                                          
103 Ponder this power-structure of the virtual world: electricity powers the Internet; our time and 
attention power the virtual world (ontological power) and the differentiating relation of Will to Power as 
power-quanta of all entities coupled to its participants with likes, shares, retweets is what makes the 
virtual world be and become. Its attention-competing-structure is twofold: an undivided kind of attention 
keeping you raptured with-in-the-virtual-world, and a differentiating kind, your private diffusing of time 
and attention on the virtual world.  
104 See: Martin Heidegger, The will to Power as Art, translated by David Ferrell Krell 1991, §16: My 
‘aesthetic rapture’ taken as a ‘mood’ does right now, right here achieve this Wagnerian rapture. But that’s 
just the preparatory stage whilst taking the plunge into oblivion. The potential for an entirely new sense of 
meaning, and therefore understanding of Being, is hidden in my ‘aesthetic rapture’. 
105 Martin Heidegger, Being & Time, translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, Blackwell 1985, p. 
264 
106 I take the semblance of the virtual world in a Nietzschean sense of Schein as operating principle of the 
virtual world itself; it is the protean nature of the will to power visible to us. See: KGW VII.3.386 & The Gay 
Science § 54.  
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world – null and void; the aesthetic is the only value that remains as a way of evaluating what is 
virtually encountered, but it too is privatized in its sensing. “Because Dasein is essentially falling, 
its state of Being is such that it is in ‘untruth’.”107 
With this interplay between truth as Dasein’s authentic disclosedness as potentiality-for 
Being and untruth in Dasein’s state of Being as falling, perhaps we can extrapolate this truth-
untruth connection active within the clearing onto the clearing of unhiddenness itself (aletheia) 
and what circumferences it as hiddenness, as lantanei – extrapolate it onto Being itself. If we do 
that, we capture the sense in which I mean that truth has always been an affair of privatization, 
of appropriation, of bringing it into a shared clearing, as well as understand that the present 
privatization of truth is merely a preparatory stage for a wholly new Being as its destruction, 
eventually clearing in a new sense of meaning and understanding of Being, emerging ‘over 
yonder’ – with its own authentic potentiality-for-Being, as standing out in a new clearing, shaped 
by new archetypes, with its own destining. This also means we can now take Dasein as a 
communal way of life as falling deeper and deeper through the privatization of truth… back to 
where the future begins. 
Heidegger goes further into the essence of uncoveredness itself, stating: “Truth is 
something that must always be wrested from entities. Entities get snatched out of their hiddenness. 
The factical uncoveredness (its Being-uncovered by our uncovering –RB) of anything is always, as 
it were, a kind of robbery (a privatization; an original theft – RB). Is it accidental that when the 
Greeks express themselves as to the essence of truth, they use a privative expression – a-letheia?” 
No, it isn’t accidental that occidental philosophy, stemming from the question “what is the 
being”, thinks about the answers to this question in the sense of depriving it from hiddenness. 
For Heraclitus, who lived near the primal source and dwelled in the clearing engendered by it, 
said of what is present-in-itself: “nature loves to hide”.108 But we love to sense what is hidden  – 
and we deprive what is hidden through technology by bringing-forth out into the open. Because 
our aletheuein is techne, this nowadays means robbing nature blind so we may see is the way 
Dasein (as a communal way of life) is proper to itself in its Being-in-the-world as disclosedness. 
  
 Conclusion: What is Truth?  
 
The crux of my analysis of the way truth is found and the domain of truth itself is this: what has 
been disclosed previously as true and the domain truth wherein this revealing takes place is now 
rapidly being appropriated and privately enclosed by the privatization of truth. It is an inversion of 
                                                          
107 Martin Heidegger, Being & Time, translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, Blackwell 1985, p. 
264 
108 Heraclitus B123, translated by C. H. Kahn, in: The Art and Thought of Heraclitus, Cambridge 1979 
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disclosing as enclosing which will eventually lead to oblivion of the western world as the ultimate 
consequence of its drive to truth.  
What will re-emerge out of this radical enclosure and the subsequent plunge into 
oblivion it foreshadows? The cohesion of world as a historical and cultural phenomenon, 
stemming from the Ancient Greeks, disintegrates by coming to fruition with the depletion of 
answers to the first question. The drive to truth has unmasked truth itself as false – same as 
Nietzsche predicted.109 What remains, now that truth belongs to the past? The definition of our 
day and age as post-truth era alludes to this; it takes feelings and emotions of the individual and 
places higher upon them than facts and knowledge about the world.  
So, what remains? What remains when there are no more standards of evaluation as 
collectively shared beliefs of what is true, good and beautiful, because the way truth is found and 
perceived is achieved in a private sense; the private sense of aesthetic rapture?  
Nothing but us remains. What remains is a who. The new impetus of the western world, 
now that we stand at the end of the orbit of the first question, will come from answering its other 
side: who are we? And the only way to properly ask and answer this question cannot be through 
the private sense distinct to the virtual world. I predict the private sense itself will become 
collective, and this collectivisation will open up an original domain of truth wherein this new 
impetus is given its breadth – thereby providing us with guidance; direction and orientation for 
us to understand ourselves, the world and our place in it. A new Grand Style will emerge… This  
will come-to-pass when private-equipment and its hook-up to world-disclosing-equipment 
becomes ingrained in our embodiment via implants…  That, in turn, constitutes a transformation 
of man as the being that lives aided by technology and language into the being that lives as 
technology.  
What will the world engendered by this radically new ‘who’ look like? How will we 
disclose ourselves to ourselves in truth? The future is face-timing us over the Internet. The 
future of the artist formerly known as man is pure potentiality – although the present confronts 
us with oblivion. Fear not! We were destined to do this by way of aletheia and the archetypes 
that emerged from pondering this clearing – specifically in relation to the being; the thing. But 
going all the way also means destroying the world this question engendered to make way for a 
new one and an accompanying question as counterpart to the first one. All creation requires 
destruction. With the Internet and the virtual world it engendered, which caused the 
privatization of truth trough the Internet’s nullification of time and space, I believe we stand at 
the eve of destruction.  
 
                                                          
109 KGW, VI. I: 153, see for more on Semblance and Truth in Nietzsche: Gerard Visser, Nietzsche & 
Heidegger, Sun 1989 § 16, p. 174/193 
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 Conclusion: the Privatization of Truth & The Origin of the Internet. 
 
What has truth become and what will truth become? –It’s domain isn’t found anymore, we take 
the wrong path and have been for some time now… Instead, already a new domain of truth has 
emerged, a privately disclosed domain, where truth is evaluated by each person on the basis of 
feelings and taste; standards derived from their path of lived-experience. We virtuals have 
become the beachcombers of our own lives, gathering lived-experience as truth along the shores of 
oblivion. But the way truth is found nowadays and the private domain it discloses – constituted 
and evaluated by each person’s lived-experience – is a transition… 
Therefore, the question isn’t anymore: what is truth? but: who is truth? –Who? –You...  
Heidegger says: “Dasein (here taken as a communal and historical way of life – RB) is its 
disclosedness.” But the disclosedness of the virtual world isn’t communally achieved, it isn’t 
historical – yet – in any overarching sense; it is privately achieved and historical only on an 
individual level as the amalgam of your clicks and queries and the results of those 
circumspective disclosures thereafter appropriated as belonging to you; corresponding to you – 
robbed by you. Nothing but the process of privatization itself is shared by all. This particular way 
of finding truth is shared, for we all have smartphones and computers with access to the 
Internet, but the results of the revealing and subsequent appropriation of the results are 
googolplex – and are evaluated on the basis of our own private tastes and feelings. Therefore, the 
virtual disclosedness is there, but to each his own.  
In turn, the disclosedness of world is closed off by privately enclosing each of us who 
reside with-in the virtual world’s disclosedness and dislosing – due to the way we reveal entities 
in the virtual world and what we do with what is so revealed. This virtual disclosing means for 
each of us a privately enclosing of world or, if we think the disclosedness of world in the sense of 
Dasein accorded to it by Heidegger: a complete loss of access to its disclosedness, to the world-
at-large and therefore access to the primal truth. The centre cannot hold, and mere oblivion is 
loosed upon the world. What was communal, shared, is now privately owned. The Truth lacks 
all conviction, while my truth is full of passionate intensity… Oblivion of world is its 
consequence… What sensible beast, its hour come round at last, re-emerges from oblivion? A 
new type of human perhaps. No animale rationale, not even Dasein or mortal – but one that lives 
as technology and the world it engendered wholly interwoven with its embodiment. For now, I 
cannot but see oblivion dawning on us, yet am convinced that the artist formerly known as man 
will re-emerge anew, for we are a resilient bunch. Quite a claim! – 
If the world isn’t shared anymore, when there is no cohesion between generations, 
between neighbours, between lovers even – who are worlds apart with phone in hand; how can 
such a world, in the sense of disclosedness as what makes it a shared world, continue to thrive? 
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It’s destining lacks direction, there is nothing to guide us anymore. It can’t guide us if we take 
thriving to be a communal affair. I believe it very much is, yet the writings on the virtual wall 
predict otherwise. We are headed for the ringer. There is an onslaught happening right now, 
right here. An old world sinks into oblivion and a billion worlds emerge on its swells. How do we 
fare then, when we are each in our own world? What could possibly guide us ashore? The same 
phenomenon that engenders the state-of-mind of oblivion by guiding our attention away from 
the world and bringing it with-in the virtual world: –aesthetic rapture…  
 
We are our disclosedness through aesthetic rapture, which draws us with-in-the-virtual world, 
with its constituents of involvement and relational significance ready-to-hand, visible and 
manipulable. Every private person is their own disclosedness of involvement and relational 
significance. The whole history of your clicks and queries, disclosing your own virtual world to 
yourself through the Internet, making the results of your circumspective disclosures your own, 
and in turn contributing to the enclosing of world and its plunge into oblivion – that is what I 
understand to be the privatization of truth and how this way of revealing wreaks havoc on our 
behaviour (Being), our understanding of world and who we are in it. We are privately in it when 
we are with-in-the-virtual-world – and most of us are with-in it and finely attuned to it via 
private-equipment. What does this wreaking havoc on our behaviour and understanding look 
like?  
The most radical contrast between the world and the virtual world is what happens to 
our sense of spatiality and temporality. With-in-the-virtual-world space and time are nothing 
but synonyms for right here and now.  
It is in this nullification of our sense of time and space where the possibility for a new 
impetus lurks; a Form-engendering force or Grand Style. What shape will this form take? Our 
form – for the body seeks to perfect itself through technology and technology labours to nullify 
time and space. Immortality, in whatever way, shape or form, is the ultimate mission. This 
transformation in turn makes it impossible for us to reach the primal truth.  
 
The privatization of truth – enabled by private-equipment hooked up to world-disclosing-
equipment – has as a consequence the nullification of time and space into right, right now. This 
consequence is what distorts our access to the primal truth, for there is no repose from aesthetic 
rapture; it keeps our senses attuned to this touch-screen under our thumb and by extension our 
sense of meaning remains latched onto it. This fixed sense of meaning entails a transformation of 
our experience of temporality and spatiality. How? –It reduces our experience of them with the 
speed of light into a singularity: your private-equipment emanating with notifications of what is 
happening in your world, right here, right now. By virtue of this nullification aesthetic rapture 
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becomes the only way the world matters to us and can matter to us. Hence, the temporality and 
spatiality that gave the breadth for world to deploy as a cultural phenomenon, as a shared, 
historical way of life that, has become distorted. To access the primal truth you need to jive with 
both in their original form to sense its domain. This possibility is drowned out by aesthetic 
rapture.  
As the equipment will become more and more private (think implants and nano-tech that 
are hooked up to the Internet), eventually, the original way will be shut – for good.   
The way we sense meaning is the way in which a possible understanding of Being 
presents itself to us. The virtual way we sense meaning and reveal on the basis of feelings and 
beliefs has the future. This new sense of meaning makes way for itself a new world by first 
dissolving the old world into oblivion. And in due time an entirely new domain of truth will be 
opened up through this nullification achieved by aesthetic rapture. –In there lies the 
transformation of man, out of which a new impetus will spring. This is the essence of my 
aesthetic rapture. 
 
Words like “echo-chamber” and “information-bubble” both point to the phenomenon I call 
privatization of truth. Both play on the enclosing of world by the private disclosing achieved via 
the virtual way. The world around you becomes enclosed and your privately disclosed virtual 
world drowns out all that does not guide, direct or concern you individually. The virtual world 
will take whatever is in question for us and reveal to us that it is real because we encounter it; 
that it is meaningful because you have revealed it by querying – and that provides enough basis 
to take it as true, to attach private value to it by identifying yourself with it.  
When you have assured yourself that what you have asserted as being the case, and 
judged what was subsequently uncovered virtually as ‘indeed’ being so, you take it as true; it 
becomes knowledge – by corresponding to your truth as private disclosedness. And whatever you 
assert as being the case, will be uncovered as being so.  
The virtual world validates any opinion, thought or feeling as meaningful and truthful. 
The structure of assertion, demonstration and confirmation will fit any query you put to the 
virtual world and it – by uncovering whatever is posited as being the case in the assertion and 
demonstrating it is indeed so, in turn confirming it – makes proper knowledge out of it. Can we 
as private people not discern what we take as meaningful and truthful? Are we not reasonable 
folk? Intelligent and rational? To a certain extent. But because we can find anything we desire in 
the virtual world we can find justification for anything, and we most of all desire to vindicate 
ourselves; to justify what we opine, think and feel as true – for the sake of who you, me, all of us 
are in our own private sense. We disclose ourselves to ourselves as truth.  
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Seek and ye shall find – thyself? But what are men profited privately when we each of us 
‘gain’ our own world, yet lose ourselves?  
 
 Truth or dare? 
 
I pass the torch onto you, dearest reader, with a dare: to play the identity-game. Though not in 
the sense of identity-politics, which, coupled to the Internet and the privatization of truth tends 
to oblivion. Yet there is a time and a place for identity-politics, too – and it’s right here, right 
now. But there is another side to the identity-game, the time and place beyond right here, right 
now. There lies the future, ‘over yonder’. Aesthetic rapture will take us there. It fits; this 
submerging into oblivion is what’s going to transform and rebirth ‘us’. –It reminds me of what a 
great thinker once said about a great people. For Nietzsche sensed the Greeks in their nature 
more than any other thinker, when he set straight a prevailing opinion about the classical-Greek 
period: “If only people would stop this soft talk of the Homeric world as the springtime of the 
Greeks, and so on. In the sense in which it is maintained, the idea is false. That a tremendous, wild 
conflict, emerging from dark crudity and cruelty precedes the Homeric era – this is one of my most 
certain convictions. The Greeks are much older than people think. One can speak of spring as long 
as one has a winter to precede it, but this world of purity and beauty did not drop from the sky.”110 
 
Grant me my thesis-claim for the nonce and ponder what must become of a culture that has as 
its only unifying characteristic the privatization of truth turned total vindication of the sovereign 
self? I think it must dissolve into oblivion. The question staring back at us in the mirror is: who 
are we? This question ended time immemorial and started time memorial.  It came with another 
question that arose simultaneously but reached us first… The question concerning the thing has 
guided the understanding of both the world as well as our understanding of self through its 
scope, as evidenced by our first question. By making our way through this question, which drove 
the western culture’s Grand Style as knowledge through technology, we now find ourselves at 
the end of that question’s orbit. Is it only befitting that the question “who we are” should 
confront us anew while standing on the precipice of oblivion.  
So, I dare you to venture out and think the Internet itself as its transformation of our sense 
of meaning, which is to say: to think the way of turning of our future ‘soul’ onto itself. –Why the 
Internet, why not us if the question is who we are? –Why not the virtual world? Because the 
virtual world will be wholly embodied and cease to be virtual – and there will be no difference 
between us and world once we become beings that live as technology. Therefore, the one-of-a-
                                                          
110 Friedrich Nietzsche to Erwin Rohde, 16 July 1872, in: Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, translated 
by Christopher Middleton, Hacket Classics 1996 
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kind-thing called the Internet is the Thing upon which we need to focus in order to answer the 
question who we are. Therefore, the Internet is an origin. It holds the key to the future identity of 
man because it will be its transformative source. –We will be transformed like the Greeks once 
were “to worship semblance, to believe in forms, sounds, words, the whole Olympus of 
semblance. These Greeks were superficial – out of depth.”111And so will we… The depth we 
will cover-up was their original superficiality and our new-found superficiality will spring from 
the Internet. It may now still disclose only private worlds to private persons and destroy the old 
world conceived in antiquity, but it is already our culture’s Greek temple and will become our 
Olympus of semblance, by eventually engendering our future Form. The Internet harbours the 
riddle of tomorrow’s identity and we haven’t even glimpsed it yet – it’s just oblivion as far as the 
eye can see for now… But whoever we are, whoever we will be become, however this new world 
will be lived authentically – I feel it will be as beautiful as it is radical in all its raw potential. But 
for now, that’s just my truth… 
 
  
                                                          
111 Friedrich Nietzsche, Gay Science, §4, p. 20  
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